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1 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
State collective bargaining laws for the public sector which in­
clude teachers have become more and more prevalent. Before 1965 only 
one state had a collective bargaining law which included teachers (30, 
p. 16). By 1973, 26 states had passed legislation giving teachers the 
right to negotiate with the local boards of education (30, p. 16). In 
other states, teachers and/or teacher organizations have been actively 
pursuing such legislation. 
Iowa passed a collective bargaining law for public employees in 
1974 (Appendix). Prior to that time, several Iowa districts had been 
negotiating under written professional negotiation agreements. The Iowa 
State Education Association indicated that "beginning in the 1973-74 
school year, there are 38 known local negotiation policies in the state 
of Iowa. They date as far back as 1964" (66, p. 1). These agreements 
were categorized into levels I through IV. Districts operating under 
a level III or level IV agreement had a policy which included impasse 
procedures--a major point in the Iowa collective bargaining law. 
Various aspects of negotiations were open to study. For example, 
Johnson (41) and Mallas (50) carefully researched the role of the 
administrator in negotiations in the state of Iowa. However, the rela­
tionship between collective bargaining and Iowa school district ex­
penditures had not been formally explored. 
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The Problem 
Organized collective bargaining in the public schools was first 
introduced into law in the state of Wisconsin in 1959. With the advent 
of public sector collective bargaining laws, local districts were forced 
to negotiate items relating to wages, hours and working conditions with 
the recognized teacher bargaining group (upon the request of the group). 
Miller and Neubury noted (55, p. 72): 
Sizeable increases have resulted from more militant teacher 
attitudes. Hard bargaining and the threat of strikes in one 
state has averaged pay increases 10 to 20 percent higher than 
teachers would otherwise have received. Ultimate contractual 
settlements ranged from no increase to as much as a 60 percent 
increase in teacher compensations. In the years before bar­
gaining the increase averaged 3 percent. In the first two 
years of negotiating the increase was three times as large. 
Quinn stated that in Michigan teacher salaries increased substanti­
ally when collective bargaining legislation was enacted.^ However, 
neither Miller and Neubury nor Quinn furnished scacistical evidence Lo 
establish that collective bargaining was indeed a cause of greater 
salaries. 
From 1967 to 1974, school district budgeted expenditures in Iowa 
increased 79 percent (8, 14). Average beginning teacher salaries in­
creased 36.9 percent during the same period, while the consumer price 
Mr. Quinn is vice-president of the Management Education Center, 
Incorporated. This is a professional negotiating firm for "management" 
in Michigan and other midwestern states. This statement was made during 
a management workshop in Marshalltown, Iowa, March 20, 1973. 
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1974-75 figures were estimates, based on certified budgets. Iowa 
law provided for "carrying over" unspent dollars to be applied to the 
next year's budget. Thus actual expenditures for Iowa school districts 
were somewhat less. 
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index increased 33.1 percent. Except for those at the top of the sched­
ule, a teacher on a four percent salary schedule with a base salary 
equivalent to the state average would have had a salary increase of at 
least 57 percent. Additional fringe benefits such as personal leave, 
were added in various districts within the state. 
What role, if any, did collective bargaining play in these increases? 
To answer this question, more research was needed. This need for more 
information on the relationship between collective bargaining and school 
expenditures prompted the following questions: 
Questions 
1. "Have teacher organizations been able to secure larger salary in­
creases through collective bargaining than would have been forthcom­
ing in the absence of bargaining?" (64, p. 137) 
2. "If they have, at whose expense did the increases come?" (64, p. 137) 
3. Were nonsalary-related expenditures increased proportionately with 
salary-related expenditures? 
4. What were the costs of training for negotiations? 
5. What were the costs to the districts during the collective bargain­
ing process? 
6. How much time did the school administration spend in training and 
planning for negotiations? 
7. How much time was involved for the administration and/or board of 
education in the actual negotiation process? 
8. How have fringe benefits affected the total budget? 
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a. What fringe benefits were added since negotiations began? 
b. How do these fringe benefits compare to fringe benefits in non-
negotiating districts? 
Questions one through three led to the following hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 
1. There is no significant difference between expenditures for teacher 
salaries (and salary-related items) by districts with collective 
bargaining and by districts without collective bargaining. 
2. There is no significant difference between expenditures for non-
salary-related items by districts with collective bargaining and 
by districts without collective bargaining. 
3. Expenditures for nonsalary-related items neither increased nor de­
creased at a disproportionate rate to expenditures for teacher 
salaries and .salary-related items in districts operating under 
collective bargaining. 
4. Expenditures for nonsalary-related items neither increased nor de­
creased at a disproportionate rate to expenditures for teacher 
salaries and salary-related items in districts not operating under 
collective bargaining. 
Question 8b led to the following hypotheses: 
5. There is no significant difference between fringe benefits offered 
by districts with collective bargaining and by districts without 
collective bargaining. 
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Terminology 
American Federation of Teachers 
Commonly referred to as AFT, this is a "union of classroom teachers 
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations" (28, p. 49). Most of the AFT strength lies in 
large bargaining units in large cities. 
Arbitration 
"If the two sides cannot settle a dispute by negotiation and media­
tion, many trade agreements provide for arbitration. In arbitration both 
sides agree beforehand to accept the decision of the person or persons 
they have mutually chosen to settle the dispute" (79, p. 426). 
Arbitrator 
Impartial person(s) chosen by the disputing parties to settle the 
dispute (see arbitration). 
Collective bargaining 
"Method whereby representatives of the employees and employer deter­
mine the conditions of employment through direct negotiations, normally 
resulting in a written agreement or contract setting forth the wages, 
hours, and other conditions to be observed for the duration of the agree­
ment" (28, p. 50). 
Contract 
"A written agreement, generally of specified duration, arrived at 
as a result of negotiation between an employer and employees. The 
6 
contract sets forth the conditions of employment (wages, hours, fringe 
benefits, etc.) and the procedure to be used in settling differences 
that may arise during the term of the contract (grievance procedure)" 
(28, p. 51). 
Demands 
Proposals, offers, stipulations, or issues which are presented by 
either the employer or the employees' organization for negotiation. 
Exclusive representation 
"Representation by one employee organization designated as the sole 
agent for negotiations with the employer" (28, p. 51). Especially ap­
plicable where two organizations exist, such as the AFT and the NEA. 
Expenditures 
For the purpose of this study, expenditures will refer to all ex­
penditures except capital debt service and retirement of capital debt. 
Fact-finding 
"Investigation of an employer-employee dispute by a board or panel 
. . (28, p. 51). Fact-finding boards issue reports which describe 
the issues in the dispute and frequently make recommendations for their 
solution. 
Fringe benefits 
Supplemental benefits in addition to the regular salary, such as 
insurance, retirement plans, travel pay, and noncompensatory items such 
as personal leave and sick leave. 
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Good faith 
Term implying that both parties honestly and sincerely attempt to 
reach an agreement. 
Impasse 
"A deadlock in the negotiating process where there is no meeting 
of minds. Neither side will make further modification of its position. 
Usually indicated by a breakdown in the bargaining process where dis­
cussions cease and strikes or withdrawal of services occur" (28, p. 52). 
Key districts 
Those districts which normally provide leadership in setting salary 
trends. 
Labor 
Term applied to the employees. 
Level % - IV agreements 
Iowa State Education Association categorization of negotiation 
agreements in Iowa. For the purpose of this study, only districts with 
Level III or IV agreements have been included. These are agreements 
containing formal impasse procedures. 
Management 
"Term applied to the employer and his representatives who are re­
sponsible for the administration and direction of an enterprise" (28, 
p. 52). In schools this would include superintendents, other central 
office administrators J principals, and assistant principals. "Depart­
ment heads, athletic directors, and other such positions may be listed 
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as either management or labor depending on state laws, local policies 
or the job descriptions."^ 
Mediation 
" . . .  t h e  a i d  o f  a  n e u t r a l  p a r t y  t o w a r d  s e t t l i n g  a  d i s p u t e  .  .  .  
acceptance of mediation is voluntary" (79, p. 426). 
National Education Association 
Commonly referred to as NEA, this is the largest educational organi­
zation in the nation. It has great strength at state and local levels 
as well as at the national level. 
Negotiations 
The collective bargaining process. 
Nonsalary items 
For Lue yuiyoaea ol this Study fionsalary itGss will refer te those 
expenditures (see definition of expenditures--page 6) which are not 
directly related to wages or fringe benefits requiring additional finan­
cial outlay. 
Principal 
The administrative head of a particular school. 
Professional negotiations 
Term preferred by the NEA, but with the same meaning as the union 
term "collective bargaining". 
'Paul Hershey, Iowa Association of Secondary School Principal Spring 
Meeting, 1974. 
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Professional negotiator 
Person who negotiates for either employee or employer as a pro­
fession. This person may negotiate solely for one district or organiza­
tion or for several. 
Strike 
Employee work stoppage. Used to pressure concessions from the em­
ployer. 
Superintendent 
School district's chief administrator. 
Supervisor 
School employee who directs other school employees. May or may not 
be management in the management/labor relationship. 
Teacher 
"A school employee who spends all or part of the time in the class­
room and who is in direct contact with students in promoting the learn­
ing process" (28, p. 54). 
Teacher salary and salary-related items 
Teachers' wages and those fringe benefits which require financial 
outlay. 
Delimitations 
This study encompassed an analysis of expenditures and fringe bene­
fits of selected Iowa public school districts which utilized a collec­
tive bargaining agreement and those which did not. The expenditures were 
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grouped into teacher salary-related expenditures and nonsalary-related 
expenditures. 
By use of a questionnaire, district expenditures and administrative 
time consumed in preparation for negotiations and in the collective bar­
gaining process were also studied. 
All districts in Iowa operating under a level III or IV negotiation 
agreement at the beginning of the 1973-74 school year were included in 
the study. Comparable nonnegotiating districts were selected, as much 
as possible, by utilizing enrollment figures and socioeconomic status 
of the community. Assessed valuation per student was also considered. 
Sources of Data 
Data to be analyzed were collected, at the state level, from the 
Department of Public Instruction and, at the local level, from superin­
tendents of the selected districts via a questionnaire. 
School districts in each enrollment category were selected on a set-
criterion basis by the researcher in conjunction with the Finance Director 
of the Department of Public Instruction and the Executive Secretary-
Elect for the Iowa State Education Association. These criteria included 
key salary-setting districts within the state and relatively comparable 
enrollments, socioeconomic status of community, and assessed valuation 
per pupil between districts utilizing collective bargaining and those 
which did not. The districts included in the study are listed in 
Table 1. 
The first three pairs of districts were predominantly rural, as 
Table 1. Districts included in the investigation 
Assessed Districts Assessed 
Districts with Enroll­ val./chlId without level Enroll­ val./res. 
level III or IV ment in ADM III or IV ment child in 
agreements ADM (32) (32) agreements^ ADM (32) ADM (32) 
1. Central Dallas 374.9 25,136 Radcliffe 410.9 31,809 
2. Central City 850.8 7,784 Springville Comm. 759.4 7,826 
3. Inters tate-35 933.1 12,170 Mt. Ayr 883.1 16,051 
4. Sumner 1118.6 12,233 Ad el 1115.0 11,253 
5. Mediapolis 1243.8 16,418 Central Lee 1301.2 14,330 
6. Osage 1761.3 13,380 Iowa Falls 1923.4 13,531 
7. Mt. Pleasant 2233.2 12,648 Fairfield 2942.1 12,950 
8. Pleasant Valley 2444.6 27,048 Forest City 1618.9 17,957 
9. College Comm. 3001.5 14,426 Southeast Polk 3314.8 12,365 
10. Ft. Madison 3658.1 17,254 Newton 4738.0 11,864 
11. Keokuk 3404.1 10,434 Bettendorf 5695.5 8,379 
12. Urbandale 3643.6 8,076 Ankeny 3832.5 9,097 
13. Burlington 7216.7 10,226 Ottmnwa 7130.8 7,426 
14. Iowa City 90S 1.0 13,385 Ames 5730.7 13,184 
15. Davenport 22,913.1 9,556 Waterloo 17,133.4 10,413 
16. Des Moines 41,135.3 11,914 Cedar Rapids 23,023.1 11,742 
^Each district was selected to be relat i.vely comparable to the negotiating district 
listed on the same line of the table. 
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was the fourth pair. However the fourth pair was within commuting dis­
tance to a large metropolitan area (Waterloo and Des Moines). Pair five, 
Mediapolis and Central Lee, were rural southeastern Iowa districts. 
Osage and Forest City were a fairly even mixture of rural and town and 
were located in northcentral Iowa. Pair seven included towns, Mt. Pleas­
ant and Fairfield, in which colleges were a predominant factor and were 
both located in southeastern Iowa. College Community and Southeast Polk 
were suburbs of metropolitan areas. Ft. Madison and Newton were strong 
industrial labor oriented districts as were the Mississippi River towns 
of Keokuk and Bettendorf as well as the thirteenth pair of Burlington 
and Ottumwa. Two Des Moines suburban districts comprised the twelfth 
pair. The location of two major state universities within the districts 
of Iowa City and Ames provided additional criteria for pairing these two 
districts. The final two pairs of districts were selected as large 
metropolitan districts--paired on the basis that Des Moines and cedar 
Rapids were the two largest cities in the state of Iowa. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Brief History of Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining as defined by Davey (23, p. 2) included the 
words . . a continuing institutional relationship between an employer 
entity (governmental or private) and a labor organization (union or asso­
ciation). ..." 
In the teaching profession the labor organization to which Davey re­
ferred was the National Education Association (NEA) and the AFL-CIO-
affiliated American Federation of Teachers AFT). The climb to power of 
these organizations as the voices of the teaching profession did much to 
forward the cause of collective bargaining in the schools. 
The NEA and its state and local affiliates, over the course of years, 
changcd its stand fro™, a nassii'e interest in economic issues and tcacher 
working conditions--teaching was work done "primarily for public service 
and secondarily for earning (one's) living" (85, p. 365)—to an active 
voice in legislation and total school district concerns. The NEA switch 
from the traditional "professional" philosophy, was attributed largely to 
the gain in popularity of the AFT. From its conception in 1902, the 
AFT membership grew so that in 1920 it was equal to that of the NEA (64, 
pp. 7-8). 
Although the twenties saw NEA membership greatly increase while the 
AFT suffered declining membership and a struggle for existence (64, p. 8), 
it was the early success of the AFT that possibly spurred Joseph Swaine, 
14 
an NEA past president, to remark in 1918: "Suppose the nation cannot be 
made to see its duty. Then there is only one other way: the teachers 
by concerted action and the application of the principles of collective 
bargaining must compel the nation to wake up" (86, p. 49). 
By the late 1960s both the AFT and the NEA strongly supported col­
lective bargaining as a right of the teaching profession. In 1969 the 
NEA published guidelines for effective representation of teachers. In­
cluded in these papers was the NEA stand on the need for formal recogni­
tion of the bargaining group (31): 
Teachers want the right to negotiate so that their talents 
may be used regularly to help in selecting textbooks, in solving 
staff transfer problems, in determining class size, and the like. 
Negotiation is necessary in these areas and in developing griev­
ance machinery, in improving salaries, and in establishing de­
sirable conditions for professional service. Better education 
of children, improved teacher morale and competence, better ad­
ministration, and higher-quality decision making are a few re­
sults of professional negotiation. 
This statement suggested that the NEA considered nearly every as­
pect of the school program in which teachers were involved as possibly 
negotiable. In fact, NEA stated (67, p. 21); "Negotiations should in­
clude all matters which affect the quality of the educational system." 
In addition to the rise of power of the teacher organizations, 
numerous court decisions and legislative enactments have also been in­
strumental in bringing collective bargaining to the public sector. In 
1935 the Wagner Act was signed into law. Smith (79, pp. 415-16) stated 
that the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) was , .by far the 
most important labor law in American history. ..." This act "... 
guarantees and protects the right of workers to organize unions and to 
15 
bargain collectively through their chosen representatives. It prohibits 
employers from interfering in any way with efforts of workers to organize 
unions." 
The Wagner Act was definitely labor-biased and consequently caused 
many problems. In 1947 the Labor Managment Relations Act (Taft-Hartly 
Act) was enacted which provided for a new and more nearly equal status 
between labor and management (33, p. 525). One of the major provisions 
of the act was that public employees were forbidden to strike. 
However, in 1951, teachers in the Norwalk, Connecticut school system 
went out on strike. They were consequently dismissed from the system. 
In upholding the dismissal, the Connecticut Supreme Court also ruled 
that (61, p. 4, 5): 
. . .  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  e n a b l i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  ( 1 )  p u b l i c  s c h o o l  
teachers may organize; (2) a school board is permitted; but is 
not legally obligated to negotiate with a teachers organization; 
(5) a school board may agree Lo arbitrate with teachers, but 
only on those issues that do not erode the board's legal pre­
rogative to have the last word ; (4) a school board may not agree 
to a closed shop; and (5) public school teachers may not strike 
to enforce their demands. 
Nolte (61, p. 5) stated: "During the next two decades these five 
conclusions from the Norwalk case became important precedents in those 
states that lacked legislation on collective bargaining for teachers." 
In the 1960s two presidential executive orders gave added thrust to 
the right of public employees to bargain collectively. In 1962 President 
Kennedy issued executive order 10988 which "... specifically recog­
nized the right of employees in the administrative branch to organize 
and to present their view on employment terms to agency management" 
(49, p. 692). 
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Executive order 10988 had many ambiguities and inadequacies which 
were accounted for in 1969 when President Nixon issued executive order 
11491. Of primary importance to teacher organizations was the greacer 
stress on exclusive recognition rights as the basis for bargaining. 
Davey (23, p. 361) explained; 
A second area of improvement over E. 0. 10988 is the greater 
stress on exclusive recognition rights as the basis for bargain­
ing. The new order does away with both "informal" and "formal" 
recognition. These types of recognition under E. 0. 10988 had 
proved generally unsatisfactory, and nebulous and frustrating. 
The current stress on the familiar private sector concept of 
exclusive recognition is a mature step forward. The employee 
organization so recognized is entitled to bargain for and must 
represent all employees within the appropriate unit in question. 
The use of secret ballot elections as the sole basis for achiev­
ing exclusive recognition status is procedurally desirable. 
Collective Bargaining: The Process 
Upon the receipt by a public employer of a request from an em­
ployee organization to bargain on behalf cf public employees, the 
duty to engage in collective bargaining shall arise if the employee 
organization has been certified by the board as the exclusive bar­
gaining representative for the public employees in that bargain­
ing unit. . . . (39) 
Similar statements were found in all collective bargaining ]aws re­
viewed^ as well as in Iowa districts operating under a level III or IV 
agreement. But exclusive representation has caused some concerns and 
problems of its own. Knezevich noted (47), p. 366): 
Considerable sums of money may be expended by rival organizations 
battling to gain exclusive representation rights for teachers. 
In large cities the competing organizations spend as much as 
$100,000 each on the election alone. Also to be decided is how 
long certification of the winning organization as exclusive repre­
sentation shall prevail before another election must be held. 
^Bargaining laws of midwestern states. 
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Still, the important fact remained, that either because of state 
laws or by local policy, once a majority of teachers within a district 
had asked for negotiations, then the process had begun. 
In an outline developed by The Management Education Center, Incor­
porated, the following items were listed as the basis of the negotiation 
process (51, pp. 2-8); 
Preliminary 
Setting the ground rules: time, place, frequency of meet­
ings, public or private sessions, press releases, note 
taking, agenda and caucus. 
Discussion 
Overview of both sides, specific points, priorities, negotia­
ble and non-negotiable items, and agreement. 
Mediation/fact finding 
This is only if discussions fail to produce an agreeable 
compromise. 
It is important to note that there has been some disagreement as to 
the validity of the preliminary segment of the negotiation process. 
Richard "ogancamp, superintendent of schools in Allen Park. Michigan, 
stated (59, p. 165): "The whole purpose of collective bargaining is to 
get a contract. Don't waste your time with what may later prove to be 
meaningless ground rules. In the beginning, we used to have strikes 
over ground rules. Now we don't have any rules at all." 
The second part of the outline, the discussion phase, is the major 
phase of the entire process. In fact, some authors believed it to be the 
only actual phase of negotiations. Van Zwoll noted (93, p. 221): 
When a difference exists, there is usually something to be said 
for each side of the controversy. Experience demonstrated that 
life often calls for a give and take that proves enlightening 
and makes consequences reasonably agreeable. Hence, the parties 
to a dispute enter into a conference with the purpose of explor­
ing all the facets of the issue at stake and of finding common 
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ground for immediate agreement and, in the remaining areas of 
conflict, acceptable compromises. This exploratory conferring 
in search of agreement is negotiation. 
In adopting policies or enacting legislation on collective bargain­
ing, problems have arisen in the third phase of the collective bargaining 
process. For example, in the collective bargaining bill that was signed 
into law in Iowa in 1974 a provision was made for a panel of arbitrators 
to select the final best offer on each item offered. 
Rogers and Phillips analyzed this section of the law by stating 
(73, pp. 28-29): 
Arbitrators must select between last offers made by the parties 
and "the offer selected by the panel of arbitrators . . . shall 
be deemed to represent the contract between the parties." 
Curiously, there is no provision for fact-finding or advisory 
arbitration, both of which are accepted procedures where a 
neutral hears the parties' proposals and reasoning and makes 
findings and recommendations to assist them to clarify and re­
solve disputes. In their stead, the bill provides for compul­
sory binding arbitration of "a final offer on specific items." 
The bill requires that if the parties have not agreed upon pro­
cedures to determine unresolved issues, they are compelled to 
submit such issues to a panel of arbitrators for hearing and 
decision, which decision "shall be deemed to represent the con­
tract between the parties." Compulsory arbitration of new con­
tract terms is very rare in the private sector, is disliked by 
labor and management alike, and deprives the parties the free­
dom to resolve a dispute through free collective negotiations. 
"Final offer" arbitration gives the panel no flexibility to 
suggest more reasonable terms than those proposed by the parties--
the bill provides "the panel of arbitrators shall not canpromise 
or alter any of the items in any final offer." Arbitrators who 
have been involved in this process have themselves criticized 
it for these imperfections. 
. . . Veteran mediator Theodore Kheel has called final offer 
arbitration "compulsory arbitration at its worst . . . you take 
your chances on who is going to make the least unreasonable 
offer." 
The example of final-best-offer arbitration gave weight to the need 
19 
for periodic review of the laws and/or policies governing negotiations 
just as there was a periodic review of the contractual agreements when­
ever the two sides sat down at the negotiation table. 
Private Sector Bargaining 
Because of the scope of this research little will be said concern­
ing private sector bargaining. However, complete omission of private 
sector bargaining would be misleading and could erroneously imply that 
private sector bargaining had little or no influence on the public 
sector. 
Successful bargaining by private sector negotiators has (over the 
years) landed greater wages, better fringes and better working conditions 
for the employers. Quinn noted that the comparison to private sector 
procedures and accomplishments has enabled public sector negotiators to 
avoid many pitfalls and to use private gains as a strong comparaLive 
tool at the negotiation table. 
However, this comparison to private sector bargaining by the public 
sector negotiators has presented some unique problems. For example, 
strikes may be deemed by some as more of a problem for certain public 
employer groups (such as police and fire personnel) due to an obligation 
of continuing service and safety. Yet "successful" strikes by private 
segments have brought the threat of strikes to an ever-present problem 
in public sector bargaining. 
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Collective Bargaining; Financial Implications 
The lowa State Education Association insists that (in its handbook 
for negotiations) these following items are definitely negotiable (35, 
P, 1-2): 
. . . full hospitalization insurance, unlimited sick leave, 
paid attendance expenses at workshops, full credit on salary 
schedules for outside experience, full transfer of sick leave, 
teacher aides for supervision duties, teacher aides in the 
classroom, addition for more adequate teacher lounge facili­
ties, ratio of pupils to professionals, number of free periods 
per week, and number of days of personal leave. 
Each of these items either directly or indirectly could result in 
substantially increasing district expenditures or in forcing decreases 
in other areas to meet the financial obligations if the negotiable 
items were agreed upon by the district. 
Quinn (69) remarked that there are five "Nitty Gritty" issues in 
cclIcctiVG bargaining: 1) organizational rights ; 2) grievance proce­
dures, 3) class size, 4) fringes, index position and 5) the basic eco­
nomic package of hours and wages. The last three of these are or could 
be financially related. Shreeve stated (76, p. 73): 
Anytime you change the teacher-pupil ratio it costs money. Each 
time you give a teacher a duty-free lunch period it costs money. 
Every time you hire an aide or an intern or a paraprofessional 
it costs money. . . . Almost everything that we talk about at 
the negotiation table really does cost dollars and cents somewhere 
along the line. 
In an address, Ervjin B, Elliman commented (51, p. 11) 
Teachers who have increased their salaries some 30 percent in 
three years have little doubt as to the value of collective ac­
tion. ... A recent study by a University of Michigan group 
suggested that while the average annual increase in teaching 
salaries in the years before negotiations was three percent at 
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the B.A. minimum and 3.5 percent at the M.A. maximum, during 
the first two years the negotiation process has yielded increases 
of eight percent and nine percent at the B.A. and 11 percent and 
10 percent at the M.A. 
The study by Rhemus (70) to which Elliman referred, while interest­
ing, did have serious shortcomings if conclusions such as Elliman's are 
going to be made. First only twelve districts were studied. These 
twelve were not randomly selected but were picked on the basis of other 
criteria. Thus, conclusions would only be valid for those twelve dis­
tricts . 
Second, the study tends to imply that negotiations had increased 
salaries at a much greater percent than would have been possible without 
negotiations. Even if this were true, the study did not substantiate it. 
No nonnegotiating control group was used for the same years to test 
whether or not greater salary increases prevailed in the two years tested 
for even the nonnegotiating schools. Thus, the only conclusions that 
could be validated was that there was an increase in salaries, and nego­
tiations were possibly a factor. 
In another study related to negotiations, Mongue (56) alleviated the 
first of Rhemus study's limitations by taking a valid random sample of 
Wisconsin districts. Mongue's study failed to incorporate nonnegotiating 
districts, but then, the main thrust of the study was a comparison of 
the magnitude and direction of the differences in per-pupil expenditures 
between salary-related and nonsalary-related items. An appropriate 
statistical test (Wilcoxson Matched Pairs-Signed Ranks Test) was utilized. 
The study confirmed that salaries and fringe benefits had increased 
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at a greater percent than nonsalary items. Mongue (56, p. 1) concluded: 
Faced with such alternatives as arbitration, fact-finding, 
litigation, and censure, as well as the ultimate in teacher-
group response--the strike--boards of education generally 
have met teacher demands of increased salaries and up-graded 
salary schedules as well as costly fringe benefits. 
Thornton (88, pp. 37-46) also found a positive relationship between 
collective bargaining and teacher salaries. In an analysis of the 1969-
70 salary schedule of forty negotiating districts and 43 nonnegotiating 
districts--all in cities of at least 100,000 people—he concluded that 
collective bargaining districts did, in fact, give significantly higher 
salaries. The data is illustrated in Table 2. From the table, it 
appeared that negotiations in these districts tended to emphasize the 
top end of the salary schedules. Because of the sample (all from large 
metropolitan areas), inferences to smaller districts would be subject 
to question. 
Table 2. Differences in salary levels, negotiating vs. nonnegotiating 
districts 1969-70 school year 
Salary level Absolute difference Percent difference 
A.B. Min 238 3.7 
A.B. Max 472 5.0 
M.A. Min 160 2.3 
M.A. Max 3,132 28.8 
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In contrast, Annistead (16) found no significant difference in the 
percent of the total budget used for teacher salaries between districts 
with collective bargaining and districts without collective bargaining. 
Her study was of 25 St. Louis County School Districts, 14 with collec­
tive bargaining and 11 without. However, in a statistical analysis 
(using the Fisher test) of amounts of personal and sabbatical leave and 
tuition refunds, she concluded that there was a significant difference 
in favor of the districts using collective bargaining in terms of the 
fringe benefits of personal and sabbatical leaves. 
Considering the homgeniety of the schools (all one county), the 
salary finding was expected. However, the finding in terms of fringe 
benefits was indicative that additional or improved fringes may possibly 
be one important teacher advantage of collective bargaining. 
Perry and Wildman (64) also found a relationship between the monies 
allocated for salaries and fringe benefits under collective bargaining 
compared with the monies allocated for other budget areas. They investi­
gated two dozen school districts across the United States. Iliese dis­
tricts varied in ". . . terms of geographic dispersion, size of system, 
public policy toward negotiations, organizations representing teachers, 
and age and structure of formal relationships" (64, p. 19). 
Obviously this was not a statistically sound sample for making wide­
spread inferences. However, within these districts Perry and Wildman (64) 
found that teacher salary increases came at the expense of budget alloca­
tions for contingency funds; building maintenance; salary increases for 
nonteaching personnel; total number of administrative personnel; total 
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number of guidance, special education or paraprofessional personnel; 
kindergarten; class size; and textbooks and classroom supplies. 
They noted (64, pp. 150-151) 
In all cases, seme reduction in the over-all quality of the educa­
tional program was required to finance increased teacher compensa­
tion, This reduction in quality may or may not have been off-set 
by an increase in the quality of classroom instruction. . . . 
Thus the costs of these short-run incremental increases in teacher 
compensation have been met through two types of changes in re­
source allocation: 
1. Shift of resources to public education within the public sector. 
2. A shift of resources to teacher compensation within the school 
system. 
From this investigation it would seem that with limited resources, 
increases in teacher compensation could, by necessity, result in de­
creased financial outlay for other areas of programs. This potential 
problem becomes even more critical as inflation pushes the cost of materi­
als and supplies upward. Thus, when even a stable financial outlay for 
other areas would purchase lesS; a decreased outlay could definitely 
compound the problem 
In a study closely related to that cf Perry and Wildman, Furno and 
Cuneo (27, pp. 10-48) analyzed the Cost of Education Index from the years 
1965-66 through 1970-71. They found that expenditures for teachers" 
salaries and fringe benefits increased sharply while other budgeted areas 
experienced only moderate increases. They stated; "Substantially 
higher expenditures for salaries and retirement benefits appear to be 
forcing a slowdown in materials and textbooks" (27, p. 16). 
Whether this slowdown adversely affected the quality of education 
was not shown. Nor was there any indication that collective bargaining 
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was a factor in this relationship. However, if teacher salaries did in­
crease substantially it would seem imperative that a shift of resources 
to public education within the public sector to off-set these increases 
would be necessary for quality education. 
Financial Implications Beyond the Negotiated Agreement 
While the major financial concern of most studies cited related to 
increases in wages and fringe benefits, there were two other primary 
sources of costs which faced school districts in negotiations. These 
were cost of consultant fees and cost of arbitration and fact-finding. 
Shreeve (76, p. 71) commented on the first of these; 
The problem is that we are now spending money for this and we 
didn't used to. When you start to pay consultants $100 or 
$200 a day, or you start hiring professional negotiators for 
$25 or $50 an hour and they spend 300 hours to negotiate a 
contract the first time around — these things run into some 
pretty good figures. These are dollars and cents which could 
be utilized more effectively, in my opinion, in educating the 
child. 
Undoubtedly Shreeve had a good point concerning the effective use 
of monies, but this applied only if the district had a competent negotia­
tor within its administrative or board ranks. Lieberman (48, p. 37) 
noted: 
If you don't know what you're doing, hire someone who does. 
. . . More costly mistakes are made by school boards in 
their initial actions and reactions than at any other time, . , . 
The second cost mentioned, that of arbitration and fact-finding, 
had the potential of being extremely high. Staudohar (83. pp. 165-66) 
noted that in twenty-seven fact-finding cases in Wisconsin in 1970, the 
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median cost was $500 with an approximate low of $300 and a high of 
$15,000. He stated that fact-finding costs of up to $100,000 have been 
reported. 
In Iowa's law a set cost of $200 per day was established in fact 
finding with the cost to be shared equally by the district and the bar­
gaining group. Thus, costs such as reported in Wisconsin were potenti­
ally in store. 
Suiuuiary 
Prime factors in the emergence of teacher collective bargaining as 
a major force have been 1) NEA's switch to a strong advocate of bargain­
ing for teachers; 2) the Norwalk, Connecticut teachers' strike in 1951 
and the consequent Connecticut Supreme Court rulings; and 3) the execu­
tive orders by Presidents Kennedy and Nixon. 
The process ot negotiations include the preliminary stages of sec-
ting the ground rules, the discussion by both sides, and finally, if 
discussions rail, mediation and fact-finding. The discussion phase is 
the major phase of the entire process, 
Public sector bargaining has been influenced by the procedures and 
accomplishments of private sector bargaining. However, the public sector 
negotiators have had to face some situations, such as the status of 
strikes in light of continuing service obligations, which are unique to 
the public sector. 
Three of the five "Nitty Gritty" issues of collective bargaining 
are or could be financially related. Several studies have been conducted 
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investigating various financial implications of bargaining. 
Rhemus (70) determined that teacher salaries in Michigan increased 
some thirty percent due to bargaining. Mongue (56) confirmed that sala­
ries and fringe benefits had increased at a greater percent than non-
salary items in a random sample of Wisconsin districts. In a study of 
districts in cities of 100,000 or more people, Thornton (88) also found 
a positive relationship between bargaining and teacher salaries. 
In an investigation by Armistead (16) there was no significant 
difference in the percent of the total budget used for teacher salaries 
between districts with collective bargaining and districts without col­
lective bargaining but she did find that in the amount of personal and 
sabbatical leave there was a significant difference in favor of the dis­
tricts with bargaining. Perry and Wildman (64) also found this to be 
true in an investigation of twenty-four districts across the United 
States. However, they also concluded that monies allocated for sala­
ries was positively related to collective bargaining. 
Other potentially major costs to districts, besides those related 
to the negotiation agreement, are consultant fees and costs of arbitra­
tion and fact-finding. In a study in Wisconsin (55) costs to the dis­
tricts for arbitration and fact-finding ranged from a low of $300 to 
a high of $15,000. 
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METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
In analyzing the literature it was determined that existing proto­
type studies are available in the area of the costs related to negotia­
tions. The methodology of this investigation will build upon the 
strengths of the existing research in order to obtain comparable data 
and knowledge. 
Selection of the Population 
Iowa public school districts were divided into two groups—those 
which had a level III or level IV negotiation agreement and those which 
did not. 
Selection of negotiating districts 
All 16 Iowa Districts with a level III or level IV negotiation 
agreement as of the 1973-74 school year were selected for this study. 
Selection of nonnegotiating districts 
Sixteen nonnegotiating districts were selected by matching each one 
with a comparable negotiating district on the basis of enrollments, 
assessed valuation per student and socioeconomic status of the community. 
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Development of the Instrument 
To test the hypothesis relating to fringe benefits and to obtain 
information relating to time and costs of training for negotiations and 
arriving at an agreement, a questionnaire was developed in consultation 
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with Quinn, Smith, Davidson and Manatt to send to superintendents 
of the selected Iowa school districts. Since information regarding 
general fund expenditures was available through the Iowa Department of 
Public Instruction, the questions related to the first four hypotheses 
were omitted from the questionnaire. The instrument was field-tested 
in two Iowa school districts—Nevada Community School District and North­
east Hamilton Community School District. Comments of the respective 
superintendents were analyzed and the final draft of the questionnaire 
was developed along with the appropriate tables for data collection 
(see Appendix). 
Administering the Instrument 
The revised questionnaire, along with a cover letter explaining 
the purpose, was sent to superintendents of the districts selected for 
this study. All respondents answered the general fund expenditures 
^Cornelius Quinn, Vice-President, Management Education Center 
Incorporated—a professional negotiating firm for "management". 
2 Clifford Smith, Associate Professor, Industrial Administration, 
Iowa State University. 
3 
Ted Davidson, Executive Secretary, Iowa Association of School Boards. 
^Richard P. Manatt, Professor of Education, Iowa State University. 
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questions. The other areas of the questionnaire were answered by 13 of 
16 districts in each division (collective bargaining and nonbargaining). 
Opinions of negotiations chairmen of the local teacher organizations of 
the districts were also obtained. Only opinions from those districts 
whose superintendents also responded were analyzed. 
Treatment of the Data 
Data obtained from the Iowa Department of Public Instruction and 
from the superintendents and negotiations chairmen were placed in the 
appropriate data collection tables. Data were analyzed using the totals 
from all districts and by subdividing the sample by enrollment categories 
of 0-1749, 1750-5999 and 6000 and over. 
Data on general fund expenditures and fringe benefits 
Information on general fund expenditures was used in testing the 
first four hypotheses. Both per pupil and per teacher (full-time equiv­
alency) expenditures were utilized. The five hypotheses relating to ex­
penditures and fringe benefits were tested using a paired-t test. 
Table 3 contains an example of the use of the paired-t values in testing 
the hypotheses. 
Table 3. Teacher salaries per FTE: 1974-75 expenditures 
Enrollment District 
Number of 
districts 
Means 
(enrollment 
strata) 
Means 
(paired 
difference) 
Paired 
t-values 
.975 
6000 - over 
Paired 
district 
number 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Mean: 
Standard 
deviation: 
t-test: 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain, 
b 
6 
$10,352 
10,698 -$961 
Mean sals ries of districts 
Bargaining 
12,116 
13,770 
13,859 
15,402 
D = -961 
-240 
^D 
t = 
29,) /n 
(9,820,663) (923.521) 
4 
1787 
1787 
= 893.5 
-240 = -0.12 
ÏÏÏÏ53 
Nonbargaining 
13,363 
15,884 
13,336 
13,525 
Total 
-0,12 
Difference 
-1247 
-2114 
523 
1877 
3.18 
- 961 
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FINDINGS 
There were eight basic questions to be answered by this research, 
with three of these questions leading to a total of five hypotheses. The 
findings have been presented by question categories with the related 
hypotheses having been placed under the appropriate categories. 
Salary Increases and Collective Bargaining 
Have teacher organizations been able to secure larger salary in­
creases through collective bargaining than would have been forthcoming in 
the absence of bargaining? To answer this question a paired t-statistic 
was used to test the hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between expenditures for teacher salaries (and salary-related items) by 
districts with collective bargaining and by districts without collective 
bargaining. Tables 4 and 5 contain information relating to the test of 
this hypothesis. It should be noted that the mean salaries per full-
time equivalency increased with the size of the districts and were 
higher for nonbargaining districts than for bargaining districts in all 
enrollment categories. This same relationship was evident in teacher 
salaries per pupil (ADM) except in districts with an enrollment of 6000 
or over, in which case the bargaining districts mean salaries were great­
er. There was no significant difference for any of the enrollment cate­
gories for either teacher salaries per full-time equivalency or teacher 
salaries per average daily membership, which would indicate that appar­
ently neither bargaining nor the size of school had an important 
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Table 4. Teacher salaries per FTE: 1974-75 expenditures 
Number of Means Means 
Enrollment District districts (enroll­ (paired Paired 
t-values ment 
strata) 
difference) 
^ .975 
0-1749 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
$10,352 
10,698 -397 -0,15 2.57 
1750-5999 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
12,055 
12,075 
26 0.03 2.57 
6000-over 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
13,784 
14,027 
-240 -0.13 3.18 
Total 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
11,849 
12,047 
-199 -0.56 2.13 
^For significance, t must be greater than t 
Table 5. Teacher salaries per ADM: 1974-75 expenditures 
Enrollment District 
" * m —H i^uaiL/ci. uj. 
districts 
ricS.it5 
(enroll­ (paired Paired 
ment 
strata) 
difference) t-values t\975 
0-1749 Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
$ 548 
574 
-28 -1.10 2,57 
1750-5999 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
597 
600 -.7 0.04 2,57 
6000-over Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
671 
645 27 
0.82 2,57 
Total Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
597 
601 
• -4 -0,29 2,13 
^For significance, t must be greater than t 
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relationship to salary increases. 
Even though there was no empirical evidence that collective bargain­
ing had any significant effect on teacher salaries, in an opinion ques­
tion summarized in Table 6, 69.2 percent of the negotiations chairmen 
felt that teachers had received greater salaries due to collective bar­
gaining while only 30.8 percent of the respective superintendents be­
lieved salaries to be positively related to bargaining. Five superin­
tendents and negotiations chairmen from the respective districts were in 
direct disagreement on the influence of collective bargaining on salaries. 
This represented 38.5 percent of the total responses. These differences 
of opinions were not significant when tested by the Chi-square test. 
Table 6. Did teachers receive greater salaries as a result of negotia­
tions? Opinions of superintendents and the respective negotia­
tions chairmen 
Opinions of negotiations chairmen (corrected) 
y.2 
Yes No Totals 
Opinions of Yes 4 
superintendents ^ 
0 4 
2.85 a 
4 9 
Totals 9 4 13 
^Significant only if ^ 3.84 (p > .05). 
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Sources of Funds for Salary Raises 
Nonsalary expenditures and bargaining 
The absence of presence of bargaining did not prove to be a sig­
nificant factor in salary expenditures but would it be significant in 
nonsalary expenditures? To answer this question a paired t-test was 
made of the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between 
expenditures for nonsalary related items by districts with collective 
bargaining and by districts without collective bargaining. Tables 7 
through 10 contain the appropriate information for making this test, 
and; although none of the t-values were significant, it should be noted 
that nonbargaining districts spent a larger mean dollar amount for 
instructional supplies per teacher and per student in all enrollment 
categories except the 1750 to 5999 group. The means for other costs 
per teacher were higher for nonbargaining districts except for this same 
enrollment category. However, the means for other costs per student 
were higher for bargaining districts except in the lowest enrollment 
category. 
Nonsalary expenses and salary expenses 
Given the fact that total expenditures were limited by state law, 
salary increases had to come from two sources--"new" money as provided 
for by the state formula and/or by a reduction in other expenditures. 
There were two hypotheses used in analyzing this latter possibility. 
Tables 11 through 14 contain the appropriate information for testing 
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Table 7. Instructional supplies per PTE; 1974-75 expenditures 
Number of Means Means 
Enrollment District districts (enroll­ (paired Paired 
ment 
strata) 
difference) t-values t\975 
0-1749 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
$ 957 
1,177 
-220 -1.52 2.57 
1750-5999 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
1,203 
1,098 
629 0.42 2,57 
6000-over Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
986 
1,133 
-589 -0.66 3.18 
Total 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
1,057 
1,137 
- 80 -0.70 2.13 
^or significance, t must be greater than t 
Table 8. Instructional supplies per ADM: 1974-75 expenditures 
Number of Means Means 
Enrollment District districts (enroll­ (paired Paired ^ 
ment 
strata) 
difference) t-values 
*^.975 
0-1749 Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
$52 
63 -11 
-2.09 2.57 
1750-5999 Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
59 
54 4 
0.43 2.57 
6000-over Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
59 
54 
-5 -0.50 3.18 
Total 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
53 
57 -4 -0.78 2.13 
^For significance t must be greater than t 
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Table 9. Other costs per PTE: 1974-75 expenditures 
Number of Means Means 
Enrollment District districts (enroll­ (paired Paired ^ 
t-values ment 
strata) 
difference) 
^ .975 
0-1749 Bargain. 
Nonbargain, 
6 
6 
$6,977 
7,055 -78 -0.21 2.57 
1750-5999 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
7,117 
6,671 446 0.82 2.57 
6000-over 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
7,016 
7,291 -276 -0.47 
3.18 
Total 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
7,039 
6,970 93 0.34 2.13 
^For significance t must be greater than t 
Table 10. Other costs per ADM: 1974-75 expenditures 
Number of Means Means 
Enrollment District districts (enroll­ (paired Paired ^ 
ment 
strata) 
difference) t-values t.975 
0-1749 Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
$371 
382 -56 -1.26 2 a 57 
1750-5999 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
6 
6 
351 
334 
18 0.74 2.57 
6000-over Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
4 
4 
341 
335 5 0.25 3.18 
Total 
Bargain. 
Nonbargain. 
16 
16 
356 
352 
-13 -0.63 2.13 
^For significance, t must be greater than t 
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hypothesis three with Tables 15 through 18 containing similar informa­
tion for testing hypothesis four. 
Hypothesis three stated that expenditures for nonsalary-related 
items neither increased nor decreased at a disproportionate rate to ex­
penditures for teacher salaries and salary-related items in districts 
operating under collective bargaining. It was found that there was no 
significant difference for any of the enrollment categories between 
percent increases for teacher salaries and percent increases for in­
structional supplies in districts with collective bargaining when 
using costs per FEE or costs per ADM. However, when analyzing the 
differences of the means of salaries and other costs, the t-value 
were all significant and in the direction of greater percent increases 
for other costs rather than in the direction of teacher salaries. 
There was also a greater percentage increase for instructional sup­
plies than for teacher salaries. Apparently supplies were increasing 
in cost more rapidly than salaries during this period. 
It should be noted that the smallest schools had the greatest 
percent increases for instructional supplies per FTE and AIM while 
districts with enrollments from 1750-5999 had the greatest percent 
increases for other costs. The greatest percent increases for teacher 
salaries occurred in districts in the 1750 to 5999 enrollment category 
when using an FTE mean figure and in the 6000 and over category when 
using an ADM mean figure. 
In testing hypothesis four, that the expenditures for nonsalary 
Table 11. Percent increases in teacher salaiies and instructional supplies per FTE, 1973-74 
to 1974-75 in districts with collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries ]:nstr. supplies (Difference) Stand, 
dev. 
t-value^ t 
Mean 
% 
Stand. 
dev. 
M«:an 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 4.76 7.6 14.04 18.4 -19.27 22.1 -2.14 
1750-5999 6 10.61 5.6 11.50 12.2 - .89 12.2 -0.18 
6000-over 4 &. 28 5.0 12.54 5.3 - 4.25 5.8 -1.48 
Total 16 7.84 6.5 16.46 14.3 - 8.62 17.1 -2.01 
^For significance, t must be greater thc.n t 
Table 12„ Percent increases in teacher salaiies and instructional supplies per ADM, 1973-74 
to 1974-75 in districts with collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Irstr. supplies (Difference) Stand, 
dev. 
t-value* t 
Mean Stand, 
dev. 
Me:cin Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
0-1749 6 5.55 7.1 25.28 20.6 -19.72 22.6 -2.14 
1750-5999 6 9.03 5.2 10.11 13.7 - 1.07 11.7 -0.18 
6000-over 4 9.55 2.9 14.01 7.5 - 4.46 6.0 -1.48 
Total 16 7.86 5.5 16.77 16.2 -8.91 17.3 -2.06 
&For significance, t must be greater thc.n t 
Table 13. Percent increases in teacher salaries and other costs per j?TE, 1973-74 to 1974-75 
in districts with collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries 1 Other costs (Difference) Stand, 
dev. 
t-value 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 4.76 7.6 17.21 6.5 -12.45 11.3 -2.71* 
1750-5999 6 10.61 5.6 23.63 9.2 -13.02 13.1 -2.43 
6000-over 4 8.28 5.0 13.35 6.7 - 5.06 2.0 -5.13 
Total 16 7.84 6.5 18.65 8.3 -10.82 10.6 
* 
-4.08 
Significant at .05 level. 
Table 14. Percent increases in teacher 
in districts with collective 
salïiries and 
bargaining 
other costs per AEM, 1973-74 to 1974-75 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Other costs (Difference) Stand, 
dev. 
t-value 
Mean 
7o 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 5.55 7.1 18 013 6.4 -12.53 11.4 -2.70* 
1750-5999 6 9.03 5.2 22.12 12.5 -13.08 13.5 
* 
-2.37 
6000-over 4 9.55 2.9 14.65 4.7 - 5.10 2.0 -5.23 
Total 16 7.86 5.5 18.75 8.9 -10.90 10.8 
* 
-4.02 
^Significant at .05 ].evel. 
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related items neither increased nor decreased at a disproportionate 
rate to expenditures for teacher salaries and salary-related items in 
districts not operating under collective bargaining, the t-values in 
Tables 15 through 18 followed a similar pattern to those in the preced­
ing tables in that the difference of the means of salaries and instruc­
tional supplies were not significant but the difference of the means 
of salaries and other costs were significant and in the direction of 
other costs. However, the difference of the means were positive in 
both the smaller and larger districts when comparing salaries and in­
structional supplies—indicating that there was a greater percent in­
crease in salaries than instructional supplies for these enrollment 
categories in the nonbargaining districts. It should be noted that 
the mean percentage increase for teacher salaries was greatest in the 
larger districts, the mean percentage increase for instructional sup­
plies was greatest in the enrolimenc category 1750-5359 and Llie mean of 
the percent of increase for other costs was greatest in the smaller dis­
tricts. Tills was true for both FTE and ADM expenditures. 
Costs of Training 
Both districts under bargaining agreements and districts not under 
bargaining agreements invested monies in research and training for nego­
tiations as is shown in Table 19. Bargaining districts had a slightly 
higher mean but a lower mode than did the nonbargaining districts. The 
range was also greater in the bargaining districts. From the measures 
of central tendencies it was clear that more districts spent amounts 
Table 15. Percent increases in teacher salaries and instructional supplies per FTE 1973-74 
to 1974-75 in districts without <;ollective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Instr. s upplies (Difference) Stand. 
dev. 
t-value^ \975 
Mean 
% 
Stand. 
dev.  
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 6.16 4.2 3.48 3.6 2.68 29.1 0.23 
1750-5999 6 8.78 4.2 23.32 29.3 -14.54 29.5 -1.21 
6000-over 4 11.86 2.5 5.68 10.2 6.18 7.9 1.57 
Total 16 3.57 4.2 11.47 26.8 - 2.90 25.9 -0.45 
^or significance. t must be greater than t_g,g • 
Table 16. Percent increases in teacher salaries and instructional supplies per ADM, 1973-74 
to 1974-75 in districts without collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Instr. s upplies (Difference) Stand. 
dev. 
t-value^ t 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 10.39 5.2 7.25 31.0 3.14 30.3 0.25 
1750-5999 6 10.09 1.4 24.66 29.1 -14.58 30.4 -1.18 
6000-over 4 11.46 4.6 5.29 10.6 6.17 7.8 1.58 
Total 16 10.54 3.8 13.29 26.6 - 2.75 26.8 -0.41 
*For significance. t must be greater than t^g^3 • 
Table 17. Percent increases in teacher sal.aries and other costs per PTE, 1973-74 to 1974-75 
in districts ^7ithout collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Other costs (Difference) Stand, 
dev. 
t-value 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 (i.l6 4.2 -.9.68 16.2 -13.52 14.1 -2.36* 
1750-5999 6 8.78 4.2 19.25 7.1 -10.47 5.1 -4.05* 
6000-over 4 11.86 2.5 :;2.ii 5.5 -10.25 6.5 -3.15* 
Total 16 i ' , .57  4.2 20.13 10.6 -11.56 9.2 -5.00 
Significant at „05 level. 
Table 18„  Percent increases in teacher salaries and other costs per AEM, 1973-74 to 1974-75 
in districts 'v^ithout collective bargaining 
Enrollment Number 
of 
dist. 
Teacher salaries Other costs (Difference) Stando 
dev. 
t-value 
îlean 
% 
Stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
stand, 
dev. 
Mean 
% 
0-1749 6 10.39 5.2 1:4.34 15.8 -13.95 14,2 
* 
-2.40 
1750-5999 6 10.09 1.4 20.67 5.5 -10.58 5.2 
* 
-4.96 
6000-over 4 11.46 4.6 21.77 8.8 -10.31 6.6 -3.13 
Total 16 10.54 3.8 22.32 10-6 -11.78 9.4 -5.02 
^Significant at .05 level. 
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Table 19. Costs of training for negotiations 
Number of 
districts 
Range Mean Median Mode Totals 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
11 $50-5000 $1082 $500 $450 (2) $11,900 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
12 200-4200 1063 500 500 (3) 12,750 
Totals 23 50-5000 1072 500 500 (4) 24,650 
closer to the lower end of the range. By inspection the means were not 
significantly different. 
Costs During the Collective Bargaining Process 
The presence of the chief negotiators for the districts were of 
primary importance in determining the costs during the collective bar­
gaining process since 25 percent of the districts had hired special 
personnel to do their negotiating as is shovm in Table 20. It should 
be noted that of those districts which did not hire special personnel, 
the superintendent was the negotiator in 56 percent of the districts. 
Lawyers represented 62.5 percent of the districts hiring special per­
sonnel to negotiate. 
Along with the presence of a chief negotiator, superintendents were 
asked to give their opinions as to the worth of hiring special personnel 
to negotiate for the district. The results of this question are found 
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Table 20. Chief negotiator in 1975-76 school year 
Number of Cost of 
districts hiring 
hiring special 
special personnel 
personnel 
Occupation 
of the 
negotiator 
Chief negotiator when special 
personnel has not been hired 
Supt. Ass't 
supt. 
Prin. Board None 
member 
8' $15-60/hr 
+ expenses 
(6) 
(1) 
$5200-6000 
retainer (2) 
+ expenses (1) 
School dist. 
lawyer (2) 
Professional 
negotiator (3) 
Professional 
negotiator/ 
outside 
lawyer (3) 
10 
Included are four districts which are listed as nonbargaining 
districts. 
in Table 21. A sign test of the paired districts indicated that there was 
not a significant difference in the opinions of superintendents on the 
worth of hiring a special negotiator. However, approximately 54 per­
cent of the superintendents felt that hiring a district negotiator had 
great worth while less than eight percent saw little value in it. 
Other expenses that some districts incurred were those of consult­
ant fees, fact-finding and arbitration, A summary of these expenses 
can be found in Table 22. It should be noted that consultants were 
used by 25 percent of the districts with fact-finders or arbitrators 
being used by 37.5 percent of the sample of bargaining districts. The 
mean average fees were 43 dollars per hour for consultants and 522 dol­
lars for the use of fact-finders or arbitrators. 
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Table 21. Superintendents' opinions on the value of hiring a district 
negotiator 
2 
Great Sane Little *)( ^ 
value value value (sign test) 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
Totals 14 7 5 4.01 
^Significant only if%^ is greater than 3.84 95 Id f ^ ' 
Table 22. Use and expenses of consultants, fact-finders and arbitrators 
for 1975-76 contract 
Consultants Fact-finders or arbitrators 
Number of districts 4 6 
Range of expenses $35-60/hr $100-1075 
Mode $35/hr None 
Mean $43/hr $522 
Median $40/hr $474 
Occupation outside lawyer - -
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Time Spent by the School Administrator 
in Training and Planning for Negotiations 
The amount of time spent on preparation for negotiations for the 
1974-75 school year varied greatly, but as is shown in Tables 23 and 24, 
superintendents in districts with a level three or four agreement did 
spend a greater amount of time on this aspect than did their counter­
parts in nonnegotiating districts. However, the means are not signifi­
cantly different when tested by the t-statistic. It should be noted 
that, on the average, administrators in districts without bargaining 
spent considerably more time in preparation for negotiations in 1975-76 
than they did the previous year. Administrators in districts with bar­
gaining also spent more time, but there was not nearly as great an in­
crease in the number of hours. 
Table 23. Hours spent by superintendents in training and preparation 
for negotiations for 1974=75 
Number of 
districts Range Mean Median Mode Total 
Districts 
with 9 10-200 63 40 10 (2) 571 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 9 4-100 23 10 20 (2) 203 
bargaining 
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Table 24. Hours spent by superintendents in training and preparation 
for negotiations for 1975-76 
Number of 
districts Range Mean Median Mode Total 
Ave. cost to 
the dist./ 
administrator 
@ $9.60/hr.* 
Districts 
with 14 5-201 77 70 100 (2) 1085 $744 
bargaining 70 (2) 
Districts 50 (2) 
without 12 4-200 62 55 60 (2) 738 $590 
bargaining 80 (2) 
^Average hourly wage computed by dividing contract salary by esti­
mated number of hours worked per year. 
Time Spent by the Administration and/or Board 
in Actual Negotiations 
Superintendents were asked to list the members of the negotiating 
team and the number of hours spent negotiating along with contract in­
formation for staff members on the team. This information has been 
condensed and placed in Table 25. From the measures of central ten-
dencip.R it is clear that administrators spent considerably more hours 
negotiating than did board members. However, the upper limits of the 
range were the same for both board members and administration. 
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Table 25. Hours spent negotiating in 1974-75 
Members Number of 
negotiators 
Range Mean Median Mode Total Ave. cost per 
member @ $9.13/ 
hr.^ 
Board 8 2-95 33 10 10 (3) 264 --
Admin. 23 5-95 45 36 95 (3) 1028 $411 
^Average hourly wage computed by dividing contract salary by esti­
mated hours worked per year. 
Fringe Benefits and the Total Budget 
Any type of fringe benefit represents at least a potential cost to 
the district. Therefore, in the analysis of fringe benefits there were 
two basic parts to the question of "How have fringe benefits affected 
the total budget?" The first of these concerned fringe benefits that had 
bppn 3(idf>d as a resuli: of collective bargaining and Lhe second a Cùiiiuàri-
son of fringe benefits of bargaining districts and nonbargaining dis­
tricts. Opinions of superintendents and negotiation chairmen of dis­
tricts with collective bargaining were taken to answer the first part 
while a paired-t test of existing fringe benefits in bargaining and non-
bargaining districts was made to answer the second. Table 26 contains 
the results of the opinion survey. 
It should be noted that only 23 percent of the superintendents felt 
that teachers' fringe benefits had increased more under bargaining while 
61.5 percent of the negotiations chairmen felt bargaining was a definite 
factor in increased benefits. Thirty-eight percent of the superintendents 
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Table 26. Have fringe benefits for teachers increased more under 
collective bargaining than they would have in the absence 
of bargaining: Opinions of superintendents and respective 
negotiations chairmen? 
Negotiations chairmen 
Superintendents 
Yes No Totals 
Yes 3 0 3 
No 5 5 10 
Totals 8 5 13 3.35 
^For significance,% must be greater than 3.84 1 d f 
and negotiations chairmen were in direct disagreement on the influence of 
collective bargaining. However, a Chi-square test of significance in­
dicated the differences of opinion were not significant. 
Tables 27 through 36 contain information relating to the t-tests 
of the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between fringe 
benefits offered by districts with collective bargaining and by dis­
tricts without collective bargaining. Even though none of the amounts 
were significant, several points stand out. First, there were more bar­
gaining districts than ncnbargaining districts v;ith the specific leaves 
in all cases except personal leave in which case the numbers were the 
same. Second, more bargaining than nonbargaining districts had health 
insurance coverage greater than just that of the employee, and also more 
bargaining than nonbargaining districts offered life insurance. However, 
this was reversed in the other insurance categories of disability and 
liability in which case more nonbargaining than bargaining districts 
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made this available to the teachers. Over 90 percent of all the dis­
tricts sampled had personal leave, bereavement leave, professional 
leave and liability insurance. Only 11.5 percent of the total districts 
had sabbatical leave and only 23 percent of the total offered health 
insurance beyond single coverage. Thirty-four percent of the total 
districts had sick leave policies greater than the state minimum and 
approximately 60 percent of the total districts granted maternity leave. 
Liability and disability insurance were also offered by approximately 
60 percent of the total districts sampled. 
Table 27. Personal leave (PL) 
Number of districts Mean 
(paired Standard Paired 
With PL Without PL difference) deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
13 0 
.154 .104 1,48 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
11 2 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t 12 d f ^' 
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Table 28. Sick leave (SL) greater than state minimum requirements 
Number of districts Mean 
With SL Without SL (paired 
difference) 
Standard 
deviation 
Paired ^ 
t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
6 7 
.231 
3 10 
.122 1.89 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t 12 d.f.)' 
Table 29. Maternity leave (ML): Separate or as sick leave 
Number of districts Mean 
With ML Without ML (paired 
difference) 
Standard 
deviation 
Paired 
t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
8 5 
.077 
7 6 
.177 0.44 
^For : significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t 12 d.f.)" 
Table 30. Sabbatical leave (SaL) 
Number of districts Mean 
With SaL Without SaL (paired 
difference) 
S tandard 
deviation 
Paired 
t-value* 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
2 11 
.077 
1 12 
.137 0.56 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (C gys, 12 d.f.)' 
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Table 31. Bereavement leave (BL) 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With BL Without BL (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 13 0 
bargaining 
.077 .077 1.00 
Districts 
without 12 1 
bargaining 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t 12 d f ^' 
Table 32. Professional leave (PrL) 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With PrL Without PrL (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
12 1 
12 1 
.000 .112 0.00 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2-18 (t.,75, 12 d.f.)' 
Table 33. Health insurance (HI) greater than coverage of employee only 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With HI Without HI (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
4 9 
2 11 
,154 .154 1.00 
*For significance, t must be greater than 2-18 (t.975, 12 d.f.)' 
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Table 34. Life insurance (LI) 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With LI Without LI (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
10 3 
6 7 
.308 .175 1.76 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t 12 d.f.)' 
Table 35. Disability insurance (DI) 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With DI Without DI (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
bargaining 
7 6 
8 5 
-.077 .211 -0.37 
^For significance, t must be greater than 
<'.975. 12 d.f.)' 
Table 36. Liability insurance (LI) 
Number of districts Mean Standard Paired 
With LI Without LI (paired 
difference) 
deviation t-value 
Districts 
with 
bargaining 
Districts 
without 
11 2 
13 0 
-.154 .104 -1.48 
bargaining 
^For significance, t must be greater than 2.18 (t ). 
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
Collective bargaining did not result in significantly greater 
salaries or improved fringe benefits for Iowa teachers from'1.^73-1975. 
During these years there was no state bargaining law for teachers, but 
16 Iowa districts did have master agreements which were very similar to 
the relatively new state bargaining law. These 16 districts were in­
cluded as bargaining districts in this study with 16 comparable, but 
nonbargaining districts, included as a control group. The districts 
were subdivided into three enrollment categories (0-1749, 1750-5999, 
and 6000-over). 
Mean dollar expenditures per teacher and per pupil were studied 
in areas of salaries, instructional costs and other costs. Percent in­
creases from the 1973-74 school year to the 1974-75 school year were 
analyzed in these same areas by per teacher and per pupil costs. Other 
expenses relating to training and preparation for negotiations, con­
sultant and fact-finders fees and the person(s) negotiating for the 
board were also analyzed. Opinions of superintendents and negotiation 
chairmen were studied and where appropriate were tested by a Chi-square 
test. Fringe benefits of leaves and insurances were also analyzed. In 
the tests and analyses of eight basic questions and five supporting 
hypotheses, no relationship was established between collective bargain­
ing and school expenditures and fringe benefits. The following ques­
tions and hypotheses were studied: 
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Question Have teacher organizations been able to secure larger 
salary increases through collective bargaining than would 
have been forthcoming in the absence of bargaining? 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between expenditures 
for teacher salaries (and salary-related items) by dis­
tricts with collective bargaining and by districts with­
out collective bargaining. 
The mean full-time equivalency salaries were actually higher in 
the nonbargaining districts as were the mean salaries per pupil with 
the exception of the largest enrollment category. However, the t-value 
was not significant at the five percent level and thus the null hypoth­
esis was not rejected. 
In an opinion poll, superintendents appeared to support this con­
tention while negotiations chairmen thought bargaining had helped 
salaries. These differences of opinions were not significant when 
tested by the Chi-square test. 
Question 2^: If they have, at whose expense did the increase come? 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference between expenditures 
for nonsalary-related items by districts with collective 
bargaining and by districts without collective bargaining. 
Although question two actually depended upon rejection of hypoth­
esis one, data relating to question two were analyzed. Nonbargaining 
districts spent a larger mean dollar amount for instructional supplies 
and other costs per teacher except in the middle enrollment category. 
Mean expenditures for instructional supplies per pupil were higher in 
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nonbargalning groups except for the middle enrollment category, while 
mean expenditures for other costs were higher for bargaining districts 
except in the lowest enrollment category. However, the t-values were 
not significant in any test, thus lending further support to the con­
tention that the presence of bargaining had no relationship with the 
level of expenditures. 
Question Were nonsalary-related expenditures increased proportion­
ately with salary-related expenditures? 
Hypothesis 3: Expenditures for nonsalary-related items neither increased 
nor decreased at a disproportionate rate to expenditures 
for teacher salaries and salary-related items in districts 
operating under collective bargaining. 
Hypothesis 4: Expenditures for nonsalary-related items neither in­
creased nor decreased at s disproportionate rate to ex­
penditures for teacher salaries and salary-related items 
in districts not operating under collective bargaining. 
The mean percent increases were higher for instructional supplies 
and for other costs than they were for teacher salaries in bargaining 
and nonbargaining districts. The only exceptions were for instruction­
al supplies in nonbargaining enrollment categories of 0-1749 and 6000-
over. Testing hypotheses three and four for significance, it was found 
that these differences were not significant in the direction of greater 
teacher salaries, thus the answer to question three would be that non-
salary items increased proportionately with salary-related items. 
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Question 4: What were the costs of training for negotiations? 
Both bargaining and nonbargaining districts were found to have in­
vested money in training personnel for negotiations with the mean average 
amount per school being slightly over $1000. Bargaining districts had 
a slightly higher mean. Obviously, boards and administrators in non-
bargaining districts were anticipating and preparing for becoming bar­
gaining districts in the near future under the 1975 Iowa Public Employees 
Relations Act. 
Question What were the costs to the districts during the collective 
bargaining process? 
Expenditures in this category included those of eight districts 
which hired special personnel to negotiate for the district, those of 
four districts which had utilized a consultant and those of six districts 
which had incurred expenses due to fact-finding or arbitration. Costs 
ranged upwards to $6000 for negotiators, $60 per hour for consultants 
and $1075 for fact-finding or arbitration. In an opinion poll, 14 of 
26 superintendents felt hiring a district negotiator was of great worth, 
seven felt it would be of some value and five saw little value in it. 
These differences of opinions were not significant when tested by a Chi-
square statistic. 
Question How much time did the school administration spend in train­
ing and planning for negotiations? 
In preparing for the 1974-75 school year superintendents in dis­
tricts with bargaining spent a mean average of 63 hours in training and 
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preparation. The same group (during the 1974-75 school year) spent an 
average of 77 hours each in training and preparation for negotiations. 
Administrators in nonbargaining districts spent an average of 62 hours, 
apparently due to anticipation of bargaining under the new state law. 
Question 7_: How much time was involved for the administration and/or 
board of education in the actual negotiation process? 
The hours spent in actual negotiations by board members ranged from 
two to ninety-five with hours spent by administrators ranging from six 
to the same high of ninety-five. The respective means were thirty-
three and forty-five hours. 
Question 8: How have fringe benefits affected the total budget? 
A. What fringe benefits were added since negotiations 
began? 
B. How do these fringe benefits compare cu Iiluge ueaa-
fits in nonnegotiating districts? 
Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference between fringe bene­
fits offered by districts with collective bargaining and 
by districts without collective bargaining. 
Superintendents felt, by a 10-3 margin, that teachers had not re­
ceived greater fringe benefits under bargaining while negotiations 
chairmen felt (8-5) that fringes were greater under bargaining. This 
difference of opinions was not significant when tested by a Chi-square 
statistic. 
There were ten fringes investigated in an attempt to determine 
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what effect bargaining may have upon them. These fringes were personal 
leave, sick leave, maternity leave, sabbatical leave, bereavement leave, 
professional leave, health insurance, life insurance, disability in­
surance and liability insurance. More bargaining districts than nonbar-
gaining districts had health and life insurance and the specific leaves 
with the exception of personal leave in which case the number of dis­
tricts was the same. However, when tested by the t-statistic, none of 
the differences were significant. 
Conclusions 
1. Collective bargaining has not been a factor in increased teacher 
salaries, although teacher negotiations chairmen thought that it 
was. In fact, mean salaries were greater in nonbargaining dis­
tricts. 
2. Teacher salaries had not increased more under bargaining; the same 
held true for instructional costs and other costs. Nonbargaining 
districts actually spent more thus lending further support to the 
contention that bargaining was not a factor. 
3: In both bargaining and nonbargaining districts instructional 
supplies and other costs expenditures had increased at a greater 
rate than salaries leading to the conclusion that teacher salary 
increases did not come at the expense of other areas regardless of 
whether or not the districts bargained. 
4. There were some costs for training but the amounts were minimal, 
one time, and should not be cause for any alarm. Personnel in 
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both bargaining and nonbargaining districts expressed a need for 
training. 
5. The costs incurred were minimal for consultants and fact-finders. 
However, the potential of greater costs would seem to exist if con­
sultants were used extensively. In the case of fact-finding the 
expense should not be a prime factor in striving to avoid this 
aspect of negotiations. The only major expense seems to be in the 
hiring of special personnel to negotiate, but even that was, rela­
tively speaking, minor as the size of the district and the size of 
the total budget increases. 
6. Since bargaining was or will be a continuing part of public educa­
tion in Iowa, the number of hours administrators spent training and 
preparing for negotiations does not seem high. Administrators ob­
viously have taken enough interest in the process and practice to 
allot time for this training and preparation. 
7. A considerable amount of time was spent by some board members and 
administrators in actual negotiations. The possibility of many hours 
at the table seems to be a reality that cernes with bargaining. 
8. Bargaining did not appear to make a significant difference on the 
amounts or number of fringe benefits offered by districts. However, 
negotiations chairmen believed that bargaining had brought about 
greater fringe benefits for teachers. 
Basic conclusion 
From the analysis of the data the only conclusion that can be 
justifiably reached is that for this sample of districts, under the 
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given methodology and procedures of selection, collective bargaining 
was not related to significantly greater school expenditures and fringe 
benefits other than indirect costs related to time and relatively minor 
costs of consultants, negotiators and fact-finders. 
Discussion 
District expenditures 
The fact that salaries did not increase more under bargaining was 
not surprising since the Iowa legislature had placed a ceiling on total 
expenditures. During these years the state allowable growth was 13 per­
cent. Compared to the state average teacher salary increase of 11,2 
percent during the same period, it was obvious that salaries could not 
feasibly increase at a much greater degree than they did. Also, con­
sidering that salaries had not increased more under bargaining and that 
there was a state imposed ceiling on expenditures, it was not surprising 
that expentliLures for instructional supplies and ether costs had not 
increased more under bargaining nor at greater rates than salaries. 
In addition, the fact that Iowa was becoming a bargaining state 
made the years of this study unusual in the respect that all districts 
were anticipating becoming bargaining districts. No doubt this could 
have influenced teacher salary raises--especially if teachers in nonbar-
gaining districts were given higher salaries in a management effort to 
avoid encouraging teachers from voting to become a bargaining unit. 
Related research 
The finding that salaries did not increase more under bargaining 
was consistent with Armistead's study (16) of bargaining in St. Louis 
County districts. However, it was in direct disagreement with studies 
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of bargaining and salaries in Michigan districts by Rhemus (70), in 
United States cities of over 100,000 people by Thornton (88), and in 24 
selected districts across the United States by Perry and Wildman (64). 
In addition, this study was in direct disagreement with Mongue's (56) 
study of bargaining in Wisconsin districts in that Mongue found that 
salary items had increased at a significantly greater percent than non-
salary items. Thus, for the most part, the evidence from previous 
studies indicated that salaries increased more under bargaining which 
was not the case with this study. 
Opinions 
The opinions on salaries and fringes by superintendents and nego­
tiations chairmen should be of little surprise since both are repre­
senting clientele that would expect or at least hope that this would be 
the case. This is probably even more true of the negotiations chair­
men since the showing here could influence the members in deciding 
whether or not to continue membership in the organization. 
Training 
With bargaining a reality in education it would seem logical that 
there will be a need for training personnel and that there will be some 
costs. The minimal dollar amount of these costs should indicate to 
other districts that it doesn't take a lot of money to become well-
informed. Since it is not costly, failure by the administration to 
allow time and put forth effort to become extremely knowledgeable in 
the area of bargaining could place management at a distinct disadvan­
tage at the bargaining table. 
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Special negotiators 
Depending on the size of the district the cost of using special 
negotiators may or may not be a minimal expenditure. But unless there 
is a competent negotiator for management it would seem that this amount 
might be very small in light of the potential damage that could be done 
if management does a poor job of negotiating. 
Time 
Bargaining with teachers probably will be time consuming. However, 
from this study two facts emerge that would seem to make the time spent 
worthwhile. First, bargaining has not been a cause for greater salaries 
or more fringe benefits and second, negotiations chairmen seem to think 
it has and are more likely better satisfied with an added consequence of 
a more satisfied staff. So, as long as management rights are not given 
away, this time spent actually would seem to favor management= 
Reasons for no relationship 
There are several possible reasons why the data did not support 
any positive relationship between collective bargaining and school ex­
penditures: 1) The Iowa school finance law invoked a ceiling on expen­
ditures based on the number of students in the school. Thus only a 
limited amount of new dollars were available. 2) The levels of the 
agreements may not have been as important as the fact of whether or not 
the district had any type of agreement. 3) The districts selected for 
the nonbargaining group were comparable in enrollment, assessed valua­
tion per student and socio-economic status which may be overriding 
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factors. 4) Negotiators may have been inexperienced. 5) There could 
have been a definite strategy on the part of the union to keep a low 
profile during the first couple of years of bargaining. 6) By neces­
sity the sample of districts was small. Possibly a larger sample may 
have indicated sane significant differences. 7) There may be no rela­
tionships between collective bargaining and school expenditures. 
Limitations 
There were some obvious weaknesses or areas which could be improved 
upon if this study were to be repeated. One of these--the small sample 
size which was not randomly selected—was, of course, mandated by the 
number of available districts. As the number of bargaining districts 
increase in Iowa a larger, random, sample could be taken. 
Considerable time and space was devoted to teacher salaries, how­
ever, salaries of administrators and other statt were not included, 
Investigation into other groups' salaries and whether or not the group 
bargained or what relationship there may have been between their 
salaries and teacher salaries would have given a more thorough picture 
of the financial situation. 
Likewise, opinions of more than just the superintendent and nego­
tiations chairmen and relating to more than salaries and fringes would 
have been more enlightening in terms of what various groups of people 
felt about the results. Some of those that could have been included 
would have been board members, special negotiators, principals who had 
to administer the contract, teachers working under the contract, 
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support staff and people within the community. Along this same line 
a more thorough analyses of what the teacher group had hoped to attain, 
their feelings of the degree of success and, where possible, verifica­
tion with factual data of the degree of success would give a more clear 
picture of whether or not bargaining was effective in areas other than 
salaries and fringes. 
Recommendations 
Collective bargaining in education will undoubtedly continue to be 
an interesting phenomenon in the years ahead. Educators in general, 
and administrators in particular, should become as knowledgeable as 
possible in this area. 
Recommendations for further research 
In Iowa it remains to be seen whether or uoL the collective bar­
gaining law will produce major changes in the schools. It would seem 
useful for the Iowa Association of School Boards to make yearly studies 
of general fund expenditures in relation to those districts with and 
without bargaining to ascertain if there will be a trend toward greater 
costs under bargaining as some researchers have indicated. Other areas 
which are negotiated should also be reviewed statewide annually in 
searching for any trends toward changes in the power structure within 
the schools. Individual districts can also do yearly analyses of ex­
penditures and other negotiated areas to check for trends or major 
changes within the district. 
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For those desiring to do related research it is suggested that they 
randomly sample the districts and use a larger sample in order to arrive 
at a more statistically sound basis for conclusions» Also, with the 
advent of the bargaining law in Iowa, the problem of ascertaining which 
districts are bargaining districts and which are not in Iowa is no 
longer a problem of definition as it was with this research. However, 
any similar research in states without bargaining laws should be done 
using the utmost care in defining bargaining and nonbargaining districts. 
In addition, while the opinions of negotiations chairmen and superinten­
dents were an important aspect of this research it might have proven 
interesting and beneficial to have collected and analyzed opinions of 
the board members and the teaching staff not affiliated with the local 
education association or federation. 
Because it is possible that the relative magnitude of per pupil 
costs may have an emotional impact upon bargaining, subsequent research­
ers may wish to classify districts by this variable. That is to say, 
high unit cost districts may resist salary raises more successfully be­
cause of public opinion and pressure. 
Recommendations for practice 
Management negotiators haje a large responsibility in bargaining. 
Frran the opinion portion of this iiivestigatiGn it appears that they 
should anticipate teacher organization representatives holding opinions 
more favorable toward the impact of bargaining on salary raises and 
fringe benefits. Obviously, their leadership roles and continued 
following depend upon it. Perhaps it will be effective bargaining 
strategy to go along with this point of view despite the fact that re­
sults frcan this study indicate that it is a myth. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EXPENDITURES 
School District 
Person Completing this Questionnaire Position 
Part I: Chief Negotiator and the Negotiations Team 
1. Has special personnel been hired to be chief negotiator for 
management? 
[ZI Yes 
Qno 
2. If the answer to question one was yes, what was (is) the cost for 
hiring the chief negotiator? 
$ contracted as full-time employee 
$ per session 
Y l-CUClXliCi L.tiC 
$ other (please specify) 
2b. Are expenses paid in addition to the above? 
I lYes, $ amount this past year 
• no 
2c. The special personnel hired as a chief negotiator is 
j [Regular school district lawyer 
I [Outside lawyer 
j I Professional negotiator 
I I Other (please explain) 
Please Return Completed 
Questionnaire to 
H. Gary Keplinger 
Box 156 
Radcliffe, Iowa 50230 
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3. If the answer to question one was no, what position does the chief 
negotiator hold? 
4. How valuable do you feel hiring a specialized negotiator is or 
will be? 
I I Great value 
I I Some value 
1 I Little value 
5. Has your district hired a consultant (not chief negotiator)? 
1 I Yes 
• no
6. If the answer to number five was yes, is this person a 
I I Professional negotiations 
consultant 
I I Regular school district lawyer 
! i Ouùsiùe lawyex. 
i I Other (please explain) 
7. What is the cost of consultant fees and expenses? 
$ per session 
$ retainer for the entire process 
$ other (please specify) 
Items 8-11 pertain to negotiations as they existed in your district in 
1974-75 in reaching an agreement with the teachers' organization for 
the 1975-76 school year. 
8. Did your district use an outside fact-finder, mediator or arbitrator? 
i 1 Yes 
• no
81 
9. If the answer to question eight was yes, what was the total cost 
to the district for this service? 
$ 
10. Board team description for 1974-75 actual negotiations: 
Outside Negotiator Total cost to the district $ 
Superintendent: Was he/she part of the team? 
m Yes 
• no 
Approximate time spent planning and preparing for sessions: hrs. 
Approximate time spent in actual negotiation sessions: hrs. 
1974-75 contract salary: $ 
Length of contract: days; Average hours worked per week: 
hrs. 
Positions of Hours Preparing Hours Contract Contract Ave. Hrs. 
Other Team for Negotiations Negotiating Salary Length Work per 
Members Week for 
the dist. 
11. Other than the teachers, with what organized groups within the 
district's jurisdiction did the Board's team negotiate? 
12. VJhat was the total cost to the district on research and training 
for negotiations this past year (include workshops, travel, lodg­
ing, etc.)? ^ 
13. Board team description for 1975-76 negotiations: 
Outside Negotiator Total cost to the district $ 
82 
Superintendent: Is he/she part of the team? 
• Yes 
• no 
Approximate time spent on research and training this past 
year: hrs. 
Approximate time spent on independent study on any phase of 
negotiations: hrs. 
1974-75 contract salary: $ 
Length of contract: days; Average hours worked per week: 
hrs. 
Positions of Hours 
Other Team Training 
Members 
1974-75 Contract Contract Ave. Hrs. Work 
Salary Length Per Week for 
the District 
i. 
Part II: Teacher Organization Negotiators 
1. Does your district compensate teachers directly involved in negotia­
tions in any of the following manners (please check)? 
reduced class load 
released time 
cost of substitute while teacher attends negotiations meetings 
or workshops 
registration and travel expenses to teachers attending negotia­
tions meetings or workshops 
other (please specify) 
83 
2. Has the teacher organization obtained the services of an outside 
negotiator? 
• Yes 
• no 
3. Has the teacher organization obtained the services of an outside 
consultant? 
iZISo 
Part III; Fringe Benefits 
Leaves; Please list the number of days allowed per year and/or 
accumulative 
personal other (please specify) 
sick 
maternity 
sabbatical 
bereavement 
professional 
Insurance; Please list the amount 
health other (please specify) 
life 
disability 
liability 
Other Fringes (please specify): 
Part IV: Opinions (answer only if your district operated under a 
formal negotiations agreement this past year) 
1. Do you feel teacher salaries increased more than they would have 
under a less formal agreement? 
• ïes 
• »o 
84 
2. Do you feel teacher fringe benefits increased more than they would 
have under a less formal agreement? 
• Yes 
• no 
3. What, if anything, do you feel was postponed, cancelled or adjusted 
in order to compensate for increases in the areas of teacher salaries 
and fringe benefits? 
Part V: General Fund Expenditures 
Most of this information will be obtained through the State Depart­
ment of Public Instruction; however, the general fund categorical 
totals will not be available for sane time for this past year. 
Please send a photocopy of page 4 o^ the 1974-75 secretaries annual 
report. 
Thank you for taking the time and effort to complete this questionnaire. 
A copy of the results will be sent upon request. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVE Please Return Completed 
BARGAINING AND SCHOOL DISTRICT Questionnaire to 
EXPENDITURES H. Gary Keplinger 
Box 156 
Radcliffe, Iowa 50230 
1. Was there a formal negotiations agreement between the 
teachers' organization and the school district in the 
1974-75 school year? 
Yes 
• 
For answers of yes: 
2. Do you feel teacher salaries increased more than they would 
have under a less formal agreement? 
Yes 
No 
• 
• 
3. Do you feel teacher fringe benefits increased more than 
they would have under a less formal agreement? 
Yes 
• 
No 1 I 
4. What, if anything, do you feel was postponed, cancelled or 
adjusted in order to compensate for increases in the above 
areas? 
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iOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 
Chapter 20, 1975 Code of Iowa 
SKCTION 1. NEW SECTION. Public policy. The general assembly 
declares that it is the public policy of the state to promote harmonious 
and cooperative relationships between government and its employees 
by permitting public employees to organize and bargain collectively ; 
to protect the citizens of this state by assuring effective and orderly 
operations of government in providing for their health, safety, and 
welfare ; to prohibit and prevent all strikes by public employees ; and 
to protect the rights of public employees to join or refuse to join, and 
to participate in or refuse to participate in, employee organizations. 
SEC. 2. NEW SECTION. Title. This Act shall be known as the 
"Public Employment Relations Act". 
SEC. 3. NEW SECTION. Definitions. When used in this Act, un­
less the context otherwise requires ; 
_ 1. "Public employer" means the state of Iowa, its boards, commis­
sions, agencies, departments, and its political subdivisions including 
school districts and other special purpose districts. 
2. "Governing body" means the board, council, or commission, 
whether elected or appointed, of a political subdivision of this state, 
including school districts and other special purpose districts, which 
determines the policies for the operation of the political subdivision. 
3. "Public employee" means any individual employed by a public 
employer, except individuals exempted under the provisions of section 
four (4) of this Act. 
4. "Employee organization" means an organization of any kind in 
which public employees participate and which exists for the primary 
purpose of representing public employees in their employment rela­
tions. 
5. "Board" means the public employment relations board estab­
lished under section five (5) of this Act. 
6. "Strike" means a public employee's refusal, in concerted action 
with others, to report to duty, or his willful absence from his position, 
or his stoppage of work, or his abstinence in whole or in part from the 
full, faithful, and proper performance of the duties of employment, 
for the purpose of inducing, influencing, or coercing a change in the 
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employment. 
7. "Confidential employee" means any public employee who works 
in the personnel offices of a public employer or who has access to in­
formation subject to use by the public employer in negotiating or who 
works in a close continuing working relationship with public officers 
or representatives associated with negotiating on behalf of the public 
employer. 
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"Confidential employee" also includes the personal secretary of any 
of the following: any elected ofiicial or person appointed to fill a 
vacancy in an elective office, member of any board or commission, the 
administrative officer, director, or chief executive officer of a public 
employer or major division thereof, or the deputy or first assistant of 
any of the foregoing. 
8. "Mediation" means assistance by an impartial third party to 
reconcile an impasse between the public employer and the employee 
organization through interpretation, suggestion, and advice. 
9. "Arbitration" means the procedure whereby the parties involved 
in an impasse submit their differences to a third party for a final and 
binding decision or as provided in this Act. 
10. "Impasse" means the failure of a public employer and the em­
ployee organization to reach agreement in the course of negotiations. 
11. "Professional employee" means any one of the following : 
a. Any employee engaged in work : 
(1) Predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed 
to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; 
(2) Involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in 
its performance; 
(3) Of such a character that the output produced or the result ac­
complished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of 
time; and 
(4) Requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science 
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized 
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning 
or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or 
from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine 
mental, manual, or physical processes. 
b. Any employee who (i) has completed the courses of specialized 
intellectual instruction and study described in subparagraph four (4) 
of paragraph a of this subsection, and (ii) is performing related work 
under the supervision of a professional person to uualify himself or 
herself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph a 
of this subsection. 
12. "Fact-finding" means the procedure by which a qualified person 
shall make written findings of fact and recommendations for resolu­
tion of an impasse. 
SEC. 4. NEW SECTION. Exclusions. The following public employ­
ees shall be excluded from the provisions of this Act: 
1. Elected officials and persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective 
offices, and members of any board or commission. 
2. Representatives of a public employer, including the administra­
tive officer, director, or chief executive officer of a public employer or 
major division thereof as well as his deputy, first assistant, and any 
supervisory employees. 
Supervisory employee means any individual having authority in the 
interest of the public employer to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other public employ­
ees, or the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, 
or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the fore­
going exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. All school 
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superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, and assistant 
principals shall be deemed to be supervisory employees. 
3. Confidential employees. 
4. Students working as part-time public employees twenty hours 
per week or less, except graduate or other post-graduate students in 
preparation for a profession who are engaged in academically related 
employment as a teaching, research, or service assistant. 
5. Temporary public employees employed for a period of four 
months or less. 
6. Commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Iowa national guard. 
7. Judges of the supreme court, district judges, district associate 
judges, and judicial magistrates, and the employees of such judges 
and courts. 
8. Patients and inmates employed, sentenced, or committed to any 
state or local institution. 
9. Persons employed by the state department of justice. 
10. Persons employed by the commission for the blind. 
SEC. 5. NEW SECTION. Public employment relations board. 
1. There is established a board to be known as the public employ­
ment relations board. The board shall consist of three members ap­
pointed by the governor, with approval of two-thirds of the senate. 
No more than two members shall be of the same political affiliation 
and no member shall engage in any political activity while holding 
office and the members shall devote full time to their duties. 
Each member shall be appointed for a term of four years, except 
that of the members first appointed, two members shall be appointed 
for a term of two years commencing July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 
1976, and one member shall be appointed for a term of four years 
commencing July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1978. 
The member first appointed for a term of four years shall serve as 
chairman and each of his successors shall also serve as chairman. 
O A yiTr ifnnnnniT nr> fho or»mmiGciAn •\xrhiph mnv nmir whpn TMp (rpn-
eral assembly is not in session shall be filled by appointment by the 
governor, which appointment shall expire at the end of thirty days 
following the convening of the next session of the general assembly. 
Prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period, the governor shall 
transmit to the senate for its approval the name of the appointee for 
the unexpired portion of the regular term. Any vacancy occurring 
when the general assembly is in session shall be filled in the same 
manner as regular appointments are made, and before the end of such 
session, and for the unexpired portion of the regular term. 
3. In selecting the members of the board, consideration shall be 
given to their knowledge, abillly, and experience in the fielu of labor-
management relations. The chairman shall receive an annual salary 
of twenty-four thousand (24,000) dollars. The remaining two mem­
bers shall each receive an annual salary equal to ninety percent of the 
salary received by the chairman. 
4. The board may employ such persons as are necessary for the 
performance of its functions. Personnel of the board shall be em­
ployed pursuant to the provisions of chapter nineteen A (19A) of the 
Code. 
5. Members of the board and other employees of the board shall bo 
allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurrp'' in the perform­
1-3 
89 
ance of their duties. All expeimes and salaries shall be paid from 
appropriations for such purposes and the board shall be subject to the 
budget requirements of chapter eight (8) of the Code. 
SEC. 6. NEW SECTION. General powers and duties of the board. 
The board shall: 
1. Administer the provisions of this Act. 
2. Collect, for public employers other than the state and its boards, 
commissions, departments, and agencies, data and conduct studies 
relating to wages, hours, benefits and other terms and conditions of 
public employment and make the same available to any interested 
person or organisation. 
8. Maintain, after consulting with employee organizations and pub­
lic employers, a list of qualified persons representative of the public 
to be available to serve as mediators and arbitrators and establish 
their compensation rates, 
4. Hold hearings and administer oaths, examine witnesses and docu­
ments, take testimony and receive evidence, issue subpoenas to compel 
the attendance of witnesses and the production of records, and dele­
gate such power to a member of the board, or persons appointed or 
employed by the board, including hearing oflicers for the performance 
of its functions. The board may petition the district court at the seat 
of government or of the county wdierein any hearing is held to enforce 
a board order compelling the attendance of witnesses and production 
of records, 
5. Adopt rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of 
chapter seventeen A (17A) of the Code as it may deem necessary to 
carry out the purposes of this Act. 
SEC. 7. NEW SECTION. Public employer rights. Public employ­
ers shall have, in addition to all powers, duties, and rights established 
by constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, charter, or special act, 
uic exclusive puwcr, duty, and the right to; 
1. Direct the work of its public employees. 
2. Hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign, and retain public em­
ployees in positions within the public agency. 
3. Suspend or discharge public employees for proper cause. 
4. Maintain the efîiciency of governmental operations. 
5. Relieve public employees from duties because of lack of work or 
for other legitimate reasons. 
6. Determine and implement methods, means, assignments and per­
sonnel by which the public employer's operations are to be conducted. 
7. Take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the mission 
of the public employer. 
8. Initiate, prepare, certify, and administer its budget. 
9. Exercise all powers and duties granted to the public employer by 
law. 
SEC. 8. NEW SECTION. Public employee rights. Public employ­
ees shall have the right to: 
1. Organize, or form, join, or assist any employee organization. 
2. Negotiate collectively through representatives of their own choos­
ing. 
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3. Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection insofar as any such 
activity is not prohibited by this Act or any other law of the state. 
4. Refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee organ­
izations, including the payment of any dues, fees or assessments or 
service fees of any type. 
SEC. 9. NEW SECTION. Scope of negotiations. The public em­
ployer and the employee organization shall meet at reasonable times, 
including meetings reasonably in advance of the public employer's 
budget-making process, to negotiate in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence, shift 
differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, seniority, 
transfer procedures, job classifications, health aiul safety matters, 
evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reduction, in-service train­
ing and other matters mutually agreed upon. Negotiations shall also 
include terms authorizing dues checkoff for members of the employee 
organization and grievance procedures for resolving any questions 
arising under the agreement, which shall be embodied in a written 
agreement and signed by the parties. If an agreement provides for 
dues checkoff, a member's dues may be checked off only upon the mem­
ber's written request and the member may terminate the dues checkoff 
at any time by giving thirty days written notice. Such obligation to 
negotiate in good faith does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or make a concession. 
Nothing in this section shall diminish the authority and power of 
the merit employment department, board of regents' merit system, 
educational radio and television facility board's merit system, or any 
civil service commission established by constitutional provision, stat­
ute. charter or special act to recruit employees, prepare, conduct, and 
grade examinations, rate candidates in order of their relative .-'.cores 
for  cprt if irnt ioi l  for  npnoinimeni or  nroniotion or  for  othor matters  
of classification, reclassification or appeal rights in the classified 
service of the public employer served. 
The public employee retirement systems provided under chapters 
ninety-seven A (!)7A), ninety-seven B (97B), four hundred ten (410), 
and four hundred eleven (411) of the Code shall be excluded from the 
scope of negotiations. 
SEC. 10. NEW SECTION. Prohibited practices. 
1. It shall be a prohibited practice for any public employer, public 
employee, or employee organization to willfully refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with respert to the sconiï of negotiations as defined in sec­
tion nine (9) of this Act. 
2. It shall be a prohibited practice for a public employer or his 
designated representative willfully to: 
a. Interfere with, restrain, or coerce pub'ic employees in the exer­
cise of rights granted by this Act. 
b. Dominate or interfere in the administration of any employee or­
ganization. 
c. Encourage or discourage membership in any employee organiza­
tion, committee, or association by discrimination in hiring, tenure, or 
other terms or conditions of employment. 
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d. Discharge or discriminate against a public employee because ho 
has filed an affidavit, petition, or complaint or given any information 
or testimony under this Act, or because he has formed, joined, or 
chosen to be represented by any employee organization. 
e. Refuse to negotiate collectively with representatives of certified 
employee organizations as required in this Act. 
f. Deny the rights accompanying certification or exclusive recogni­
tion granted in this Act. 
g. Refuse to participate in good faith in any agreed upon impasse 
procedures or those set forth in this Act. 
h. Engage in a lockout. 
3. It shall be a prohibited practice for public employees or an em­
ployee organization or for any person, union, or organization or their 
agents willfully to : 
a. Interfere with, restrain, coerce, or harass any public employee 
with respect to any of his rights under this Act or in order to prevent 
or discourage his exercise of any such right, including, without limi­
tation, all rights under section eight (8) of this Act. 
b. Interfere, restrain, or coerce a public employer with respect to 
rights granted in this Act or with respect to selecting a representative 
for the purposes of negotiating collectively on the adjustment of 
grievances. 
c. Refuse to bargain collectively with a public employer as required 
in this Act. 
d. Refuse to participate in good faith in any agreed upon impasse 
procedures or those set forth in this Act. 
e. Violate section twelve (12) of this Act. 
f. Violate the provisions of chapter seven hundred thirty-six B 
(736B), sections one (1), two (2) and three (3) of the Code, which 
are hereby made applicable to public employers, public employees and 
public employee organizations. 
g. Picket in a manner which interferes with ingress and egress to 
the facilities of the public employer. 
h. Engage in, initiate, sponsor or support any picketing that is per­
formed in support of a strike, work stoppage, boycott or slowdown 
against a public employer. 
i. Picket for any unlawful purpose. 
4. The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis­
semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual 
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of any unfair labor practice 
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threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 
SEC. 11. NEW SECTION. Prohibited practice violations. 
1. Proceedings against a party alleging a violation of section ten 
(10) of this Act, shall be commenced by filing a complaint with the 
board within ninety days of the alleged violation causing a copy of 
the complaint to be served upon the accused party in the manner of an 
original notice as provided in this Act. The accused party shall have 
ten days v/ithin which to file a written answer to the complaint. 
However, the board may conduct a preliminary investigation of the 
alleged violation, and if the board determines that the complaint 
has no basis in fact, the board may dismiss the complaint. The 
board shall promptly thereafter set a time and place for hearing in the 
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county where the alleged violation occurred. The parties shall be per­
mitted to be represented by counsel, summon witnesses, and request 
the board to subpoena witnesses on the requestor's behalf. Compliance 
with the technical rules of pleading and evidence shall not be required. 
2. The board may designate a hearing officer to conduct the hearing. 
The hearing officer shall have such powers as may be exercised by the 
board for conducting the hearing and shall follow the procedures 
adopted by the board for conducting the hearing. The decision of the 
hearing officer may be appealed to the board and the board may hear 
the case de novo or upon the record as submitted before the hearing 
officer, utilizing procedures governing appeals to the district court in 
this section so far as applicable. 
3. The board shall appoint a certified shorthand reporter to report 
the proceedings and the board shall fix the reasonable amount of com­
pensation for such service, which amount shall be taxed as other costs. 
4. The board shall file its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
If the board finds that the party accused has committed a prohibited 
practice, the board may, within thirty days of its decision, enter into 
a consent order with the party to discontinue the practice, or petition 
the district court for injunctive relief pursuant to chapter six hundred 
sixty-four (664) of the Code. 
5. Any party aggrieved by any decision or order of the board may 
within ten days from the date such decision or order is filed, appeal 
therefrom to the district court of the county in which the hearing was 
held, by filing with the board a written notice of appeal setting forth 
in general terms the decision appealed from and the grounds of the 
appeal. The board shall forthwith give notice to the other parties in 
interest. 
6. Within thirty days after a notice of appeal is filed with the board, 
it shall make, certify, and file in the office of the clerk of court to 
which the appeal is taken, a full and complote transcript of all docu­
ments in the case, including any depositions and a iranscripi or cer­
tificate of the evidence together with the notice of appeal. 
7. The appeal shall be triable at any time after the expiration of 
twenty days from the date of filing the transcript by the board and 
after twenty days notice in writing by either party and the board upon 
the other. 
8. The transcript as certified and filed by the board shall be the 
record on which the appeal shall be heard, and no additional evidence 
shall be heard. In the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by 
the board shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on 
the record considered as a whole. 
9. Any order or decision of the board may be modified, reversed, or 
set aside on one or more of the following grounds and on no other: 
a. If the board acts without or in excess of its powers. 
b. If the order was procured by fraud or is contrary to law. 
c. If the facts found by the board do not support the order. 
d. If the order is not supported by a preponderance of the competent 
evidence on the record considered as a whole. 
10. When the district court, on appeal, reverses or sets aside an 
o/der or decision of the board, it may remand the case to the board for 
further proceedings in harmony with the holdings of the court, or it 
may enter the proper judgment, as the case may be. Such judgment or 
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decree shall have the same force and effect as if action had been 
originally brought and tried in said court. The assessment of costs in 
such appeals shall be in the discretion of the court. 
11. An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from any final 
order, judgment, or decree of the district court. 
SEC. 12. NEW SECTION. Strikes prohibited. 
1. It shall be unlawful for any public employee or any employee 
organization, directly or indirectly, to induce, instigate, encourage, 
authorize, ratify, or participate in a strike against any public em­
ployer. 
2. It shall be unlawful for any public employer to authorize, con­
sent to, or condone a strike; or to pay or agree to pay any public 
employee for any day in which the employee participates in a strike; 
or to pay or agree to pay any increase in compensation or benefits to 
any public employee in response to or as a result of any strike or any 
act which violates subsection one (1) of this section. It shall be unlaw­
ful for any official, director, or representative of any public employer 
to authorize, ratify, or participate in any violation of this subsection. 
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent new or renewed bargaining 
and agreement within the scope of negotiations as defined by this Act, 
at any time after such violation of subsection one (1) has ceased; 
but it shall be unlawful for any public employer or employee organ­
ization to bargain at any time regarding suspension or modification 
of any penalty provided in this section or regarding any request by 
the public employer to a court for such suspension or modification. 
3. In the event of any violation or imminently threatened violation 
of subsection one (1) or two (2) of this section, any citizen domiciled 
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the public employer may peti­
tion the district court for the county in which the violation occurs or 
the district court for Polk county for ;in In junction restrnininjr snrb 
violation or imminently threatened violation. Chapter six hundred 
sixty-four (664) of the Code and the pertinent rules of civil procedure 
regarding injunctions shall apply. However, the court shall grant a 
temporary injunction if it appears to the court that a violation has 
occurred or is imminently threatened ; the plaintiff need not show that 
the violation or threatened violation would greafiy or irreparably 
injure him; and no bond shall be required of the plaintiff unless the 
court determines that a bond is necessary in the public interest. Fail­
ure to comply with any temporary or permanent injunction granted 
pursuant to this section shall constitute a contempt punishal)le pur-
siinnt to chapter six hundred sixty-five (605) of the Code. The punish­
ment shall not exceed five hundred dollars for an individual, or ten 
thousand dollars for an employee organization or public employer, for 
each day during which the failure to comply continues, or imprison­
ment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or both such fine and 
imprisonment. An individual or an employee organization which 
makes an active good faith effort to comply fully with the injunction 
shall not be deemed to l)e in contempt. 
4. If a public employee is held to be in contempt of court for failure 
to comply with an injunction pursuant to this section, or is convicted 
of violating this section, he shall be ineligible for any employment by 
the same public employer for a period of twelve months. His public 
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employer shall immediately discharge him, but upon his request the 
court shall stay his discharge to permit further judicial proceedings. 
5. If an employee organization or any of its olTicers is held to be in 
contempt of court for failure to comply with an injunction pursuant 
to this section, or is convicted of violating this section, the employee 
organization shall be immediately decertified, shall cease to represent 
the bargaining unit, shall cease to receive any dues by checkoff, and 
may again be certified only after twelve months have elapsed from the 
effective date of decertification and only after a new compliance with 
section fourteen (14) of this Act. The penalties provided in this sec­
tion may be suspended or modified by the court, but only upon request 
of the public employer and only if the court determines the suspension 
or modification is in the public interest. 
6. Each of the remedies and penalties provided by this section is 
separate and several, and is in addition to any other legal or equitable 
remedy or penalty. 
SEC. 13. NEW SECTION. Bargaining unit determination. 
1. Board determination of an appropriate bargaining unit shall be 
upon petition filed by a public employer, public employee, or employee 
organization. 
2. Within thirty days of receipt of a petition or notice to all inter­
ested parties if on its own initiative, the board shall conduct a public 
hearing, receive written or oral testimony, and promptly thereafter 
file an order defining the appropriate bargaining unit. In defining the 
unit, the board shall take into consideration, along with other relevant 
factors, the principles of efficient admini.stration of government, the 
existence of a community of interest among public employee.^, the 
history and extent of public employee organization, geographical loca­
tion, and the recommendations of the parties involved. 
3. Appeals from such order shall be governed by appeal provisions 
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4. Professional and nonprofessional employees shall not be included 
in the same bargaining unit unless a majority of both agree. 
SEC. 14. NEW SECTION. 15argaining reprc.scn(a(ive determination. 
1. Board certification of an employee organization as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of a bargaining unit shall be upon a petition 
filed with the board by a public employer, public employee, or an 
employee organization and an election conducted pursuant to section 
fifteen (15) of this Act. 
2. The petition of an employee organization shall allege that: 
a. The employee organization has submitted a request to a public 
employer to bargain collectively with a designated group of public 
employees. 
b. The petition is accompanied by written evidence that thirty per­
cent of such public employees are members of the employee organiza­
tion or have authorized it to represent them for the purposes of collec­
tive bargaining. 
3. The petition of a public employee shall allege that an employee 
organization which has been certilicd as the bargaining representa­
tive does not represent a majority of such public employees and that 
the petitioners do not want to be represented by an cm.ployee organ­
ization or seek certification of an employee organization. 
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4. The petition of a public employer shall allege that it has received 
a request to bargain from an employee organization which has not 
been certified as the bargaining representative of the public employees 
in an appropriate bargaining unit. 
5. The board shall investigate the allegations of any petition and 
shall give reasonable notice of the receipt of such a petition to all 
public employees, employee organizations and public employers named 
or described in such petitions or interested in the representation ques­
tioned. The board shall thereafter call an election under section fifteen 
(15) of this Act, unless: 
a. It finds that less than thirty percent of the public employees in 
the unit appropriate for collective bargaining support the petition for 
decertification or for certification. 
b. The appropriate bargaining unit has not been determined pur­
suant to section thirteen (13) of this Act. 
6. The hearing and appeal procedures shall be the same as provided 
in section eleven (11) of this Act. 
SEC. 15. NEW SECTION. Elections. 
1. Upon the filing of a petition for certification of an employee 
organization, the board shall submit two questions to the public em­
ployees at an election in an appropriate bargaining unit. The first 
question on the ballot shall permit the public employees to determine 
whether or not such public employees desire exclusive bargaining 
representation. The second question on the ballot shall list any em­
ployee organization which has petitioned for certification or which 
has presented proof satisfactory to the board of support of ten percent 
or more of the public employees in the appropriate unit. 
2. If a majority of the votes cast on the first question are in the 
negative, the public employees shall not be represented by an em­
ployee organization. If a majority of the votes cast on the first 
4UCOUUII iO ill tlic aiiii jitiaLi V c, i/iicii mc j cc ui icvuiv-
ing a majority of the votes cast on the second question shall repre.sent 
the public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 
3. If none of the choices on the ballot receive the vote of a majority 
of the public employees who could be represented by an employee 
organization, the board shall conduct a runoff election among the two 
choices receiving the greatest number of votes. 
4. Upon written objections filed by any party to the election within 
ten days after notice of the results of the election, if the board finds 
that misconduct or other circumstances prevented the public employees 
eligible to vote from freely expressing their preferences, the board 
may invalidate the election and hold a second election for the public 
employees. 
5. Upon completion of a valid election in which the majority choice 
of the employees who could be represented by an employee organiza­
tion is determined, the board shall certify the results of the election 
and shall give reasonable notice of the order to all employee organiza­
tions listed on the ballot, the public employers, and the public employ­
ees in the appropriate bargaining unit. 
6. A petition for certification as an exclusive bargaining representa­
tive shall not be considered by the board for a period of one year from 
the date of the certification or noncertification of an exclusive bargain­
ing representative or during the duration of a collective bargaining 
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agreement which shall not exceed two years. A collective bargaining 
agreement with the state, its boards, commissions, departments, and 
agencies shall be for two years and the effective date of any such agree­
ment shall be July first of odd-numbered years. However, if a petition 
for decertification is filed during the duration of a collective bargaining 
agreement, the board shall award an election under this section not 
more than one hundred eighty days nor less than one hundred fifty 
days prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 
If an employee organization is decertified, the board may receive peti­
tions under section fourteen (14) of this Act, provided that no such 
petition and no election conducted pursuant to such petition within 
one year from decertification shall include as a party the decertified 
employee organization. 
SEC. 16. NEW SECTION. Duty to bargain. Upon the receipt by a 
public employer of a request from an employee organization to bargain 
on behalf of public employees, the duty to engage in collective bargain­
ing shall arise if the employee organization has been certified by the 
board as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public em­
ployees in that bargaining unit. 
SEC. 17. NEW SECTION. Procedures. 
1. The employee organization certified as the bargaining representa­
tive shall be the exclusive representative of all public employees in the 
bargaining unit and shall represent all public employees fairly. How­
ever, any public employee may meet and adjust individual complaints 
with a public employer. 
2. The employee organization and the public employer may desig­
nate any individual as its representative to engage in collective bar­
gaining negotiations. 
3. Negotiating sessions, including strategy meetings of public em­
ployers or eniployee urbanizations, mediation and the deliberative 
process of arbitrators shall be exempt from the provisions of chapter 
twenty-eight A (28A) of the Code. Hearings conducted by arbitrators 
shall be open to the public. 
4. The terms of a proposed collective bargaining agreement shall be 
made public and reasonable notice shall be given to the public employ­
ees prior to a ratification election. The collective bargaining agree­
ment shall become effective only if ratified by a majority of those 
voting by secret ballot. 
5. Terms of any collective bargaining agreement may be enforced 
by a civil action in the district court of the county in which the agree­
ment was made upon the initiative of cither party. 
6. No collective bargaining agreement or arbitrators' decision shall 
be valid or enforceable if its implementation would be inconsistent 
with any statutory limitation on the public employer's funds, spend­
ing, or budget or would substantially impair or limit the performance 
of any statutory duty by the public employer. A collective bargaining 
agreement or arbitrators' award may provide for benefits conditional 
upon specified funds to be obtained by the public employer, but the 
agreement shall provide either for automatic reduction of such condi­
tional benefits or for additional bargaining if the funds are not 
obtained or if a lesser amount is obtained. 
7. If agreed to by the parties nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to prohibit supplementary bargaining on behalf of public employees 
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in a part of the bargaining unit concerning matters uniquely affecting 
those public employees or cooperation and coordination of bargaining 
between two or more bargaining units. 
8. The salaries of all public employees of the state under a merit 
system and all other fringe benefits which are granted to all public 
employees of the state shall be negotiated with the governor or his 
designee on a statewide basis, except those benefits which are not sub­
ject to negotiations pursuant to the provisions of section nine (9) of 
this Act. 
9. A public employee or any employee organization shall not nego­
tiate or attempt to negotiate directly with a member of the governing 
board of a public employer if the public employer has appointed or 
authorized a bargaining representative for the purpose of bargaining 
with the public employees or their representative, unless the member 
of the governing board is the designated bargaining representative of 
the public employer. 
SEC. 18. NEW SECTION. Grievance procedures. An agreement 
with an employee organization which is the exclusive representative 
of public employees in an appropriate unit may provide procedures 
for the consideration of public employee grievances and of disputes 
over the interpretation and application of agreements. Negotiated 
procedures may provide for binding arbitration of public employee 
grievances and of disputes over the interpretation and application of 
existing agreements. An arbitrator's decision on a grievance may not 
change or amend the terms, conditions or applications of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Such procedures shall provide for the invoking 
of arbitration only with the approval of the employee organization, 
and in the case of an employee grievance, only with the approval of 
the public employee. The costs of arbitration shall be shared equally 
by_the parties. 
Mnhiir pmpinypps nf ihp stare sh;iii lol'iow' eiiher Lhe grievance pro­
cedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement, or in the event 
that no such procedures are so provided, shall follow grievance proce­
dures established pursuant to chapter nineteen A (IDA) of the Code. 
SEC. 19. NEW SECTION. Impasse procedures—agreement of par­
ties. As the first step in the performance of ineir duly lo bargain, 
the public employer and the employee organization shall endeavor to 
agree upon impasse procedures. Such agreement shall provide for 
implementation of these impasse procedures not later than one hun­
dred twenty days prior to the certified budget submission date of the 
public employer. If the parties fail to agree upon impasse procedures 
under the provisions of this section, the impasse procedures provided 
in sections twenty (20), twenty-one (21) and twenty-two (22) of this 
Act shall apply. 
SEC. 20. NEW SECTION. Mediation. In the absence of an im­
passe agreement between the parties or the failure of either party to 
utilize its procedures, one hundred twenty days prior to the certified 
budget submission date, the board shall, upon the request of either 
party, appoint an impartial and disinterested person to act as medi­
ator. It shall be the function of the mediator to bring the parties 
together to effectuate a settlement of the dispute, but the mediator 
may not compel the parties to agree. 
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SEC. 21. NEW SECTION. Fact-finding. If the impasse persists 
ten days after the mediator has been appointed, the board shall appoint 
a fact-finder representative of the public, from a list of qualified per­
sons maintained by the board. The fact-finder shall conduct a hearing, 
may administer oaths, and may request the board to issue subpoenas. 
The fact-finder shall make written findings of facts and recommenda­
tions for resolution of the dispute and, not later than fifteen days from 
the day of appointment, shall serve such findings on the public em­
ployer and the certified employee organization. 
The public employer and the certified employee organization shall 
immediately accept the fact-finder's recommendation or shall within 
five days submit the fact-finder's recommendations to the governing 
body and members of the certified employee organization for accept­
ance or rejection. If the dispute continues ten days after the report is 
submitted, the report shall be made public by the board. 
SEC. 22. NEW SECTION. Binding arbitration. 
1. If an impasse persists after the findings of fact and recommenda­
tions are made public by the fact-finder, the parties may continue to 
negotiate or, the board shall have the power, upon reciuest of either 
party, to arrange for arbitration, which shall be binding. The request 
for arbitration shall be in writing and a copy of the request shall be 
served upon the other party. 
2. Each party shall submit to the board within four days of request 
a final offer on the impasse items with proof of service of a copy upon 
the other party. Each party shall also submit a copy of a draft of the 
proposed collective bargaining agreement to the extent to which agree­
ment has been reached and the name of its selected arbitrator. The 
parties may continue to negotiate all offers until an agreement is 
reached or a decision rendered by the panel of arbitrators. 
As an alternative orocedure. the two parties may axree to submit 
the dispute to a single arbitrator. If the parties cannot agree on the 
arbitrator within four days, the selection shall be made pursuant to 
subsection five (5) of this section. The full costs of arbitration under 
this provision shall be shared equally by the parties to the dispute. 
3. The submission of the impasse items to the arbitrators shall be 
limited to those issues that had been considered by the fact-finder and 
upon which the parties have not reached agreement. With respect to 
each such item, the arbitration board award shall be restricted to the 
final offers on each impasse item submitted by the parties to the arbi­
tration board or to the recommendation of the fact-finder on each 
AXjy^kkk, 
4. The panel of arbitrators shall consist of three members appointed 
in the following manner : 
a. One member shall be appointed by the public employer. 
b. One member shall be appointed by the employee organization. 
c. One member shall be appointed mutually by the members appoint­
ed by the public employer and the employee organization. The last 
member appointed shall be the chairman of the panel of arbitrators. 
No member appointed shall be an employee of the parties. 
d. The public employer and employee organization shall each pay 
the fees and expenses incurred by the arbitrator each selected. The 
1-13 
99 
fee and expenses of the chairman of the panel and all other costs of 
arbitration shall be shared equally. 
5. If the third member has not been selected within four days of 
notification as provided in subsection two (2) of this section, a list of 
three arbitrators shall be submitted to the parties by the board. The 
two arbitrators selected by the public employer and the employee 
organization shall determine by lot which arbitrator shall remove the 
first name from the list submitted by the board. The arbitrator having 
the right to remove the first name shall do so within two days and the 
second arbitrator shall have one additional day to remove one of the 
two remaining names. The person whose name remains shall become 
the chairman of the panel of arbitrators and shall call a meeting within 
ten days at a location designated by him. 
6. If a vacancy should occur on the panel of arbitrators, the selec­
tion for replacement of such member shall be in the same manner and 
within the same time limits as the original member was chosen. No 
final selection under subsection nine (9) of this section shall be made 
by the board until the vacancy has been filled. 
7. The panel of arbitrators shall at no time engage in an effort to 
mediate or otherwise settle the dispute in any manner other than that 
prescribed in this section. 
8. From the time of appointment until such time as the panel of 
arbitrators makes its final determination, there shall be no discussion 
concerning recommendations for settlement of the dispute by the 
members of the panel of arbitrators with parties other than those who 
are direct parties to the dispute. The panel of arbitrators may conduct 
formal or informal hearings to discuss offers submitted by both 
parties. 
9. The panel of arbitrators shall consider, in addition to any other 
relevant factors, the following factors ; 
a, Tast ccllsctivc bargaining contracts betv/een the parties irr!""-
ing the bargaining that led up to such contracts. 
D. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the 
involved public employees with those of other public employees doing 
comparable work, giving consideration to factors peculiar to the area 
and the classifications involved. 
c. The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public 
employer to finance economic adjustments and the effect of such 
adjustments on the normal standard of services. 
d. The power of the public employer to levy taxes and appropriate 
funds for the conduct of its operations. 
10. The chairman of the panel of arbitrators may hoid hearings and 
administer oaths, examine witnesses and documents, take testimony 
and receive evidence, issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of wit­
nesses and the production of records, and delegate such powers to 
other members of the panel of arbitrators. The chairman of the panel 
of arbitrators may petition the district court at the seat of government 
or of the county in which any hearing is held to enforce the order of 
the chairman compelling the attendance of witnesses and the produc­
tion of records. 
11. A majority of the panel of arbitrators shall select within fifteen 
days after its first meeting the moat reasonable offer, in its judgment, 
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of the final ofTers on each impasse item submitted by the parties, or 
the recommendations of the fact-finder on each impasse item. 
12. The selections by the panel of arbitrators and items agreed upon 
by the public employer and the employee organization, shall be deemed 
to be the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 
13. The determination of the panel of arbitrators shall be by major­
ity vote and shall be final and binding subject to the provisions of 
section seventeen (17), subsection six (6), of this Act. The panel of 
arbitrators shall give written explanation for its selection and inform 
the parties of its decision. 
SEC. 23. NEW SECTION. Legal actions. Any employee organiza­
tion and public employer may sue or be sued as an entity under the 
provisions of this Act. Service upon the public employer shall be in 
accordance with law or the rules of civil procedure. Nothing in this 
Act shall be construed to make any individual or his assets liable for 
any judgment against a public employer or an employee organization. 
SEC. 24. NEW SECTION. Notice and service. Any notice required 
under the provisions of this Act shall be in writing, but service 
thereof shall be sufficient if mailed by restricted certified mail, return 
receipt requested addressed to the last known address of the parties, 
unless otherwise provided in this Act. Refusal of restricted certified 
mail by any party shall be considered service. Prescribed time periods 
shall commence from the date of the receipt of the notice. Any party 
may at any time execute and deliver an acceptance of service in lieu 
of mailed notice. 
SEC. 25. NEW SECTION. Internal conduct of employee organiza­
tions. 
1. Every employee organization which is certified as a representa­
tive of public employees under the provisions nf this Act .shall file with 
the board a registration report, signed by its presiùeiiL or other appro­
priate officer. The report shall be in a form prescribed by the board 
and shall be accompanied by two copies of the employee organization's 
constitution and bylaws. A filing by a national or international em­
ployee organization of its constitution and bylaws shall be accepted in 
lieu of a filing of such documents by each subordiiiale organiiiation. 
All changes or amendments to such constitutions and bylaws shall be 
promptly reported to the board. 
2. Every employee organization shall file with the board an annual 
report and an amended report whenever changes are made. The 
reports shall be in a form prescribed by the board, and shall provide 
the following information: 
a. The names and addresses of the organization, any parent organ­
ization or organizations with which it is affiliated, the principal offi­
cers, and all representatives. 
b. The name and address of its local agent for service of process. 
c. A general description of the public employees the organization 
represents or seeks to represent. 
d. The amounts of the initiation fee and monthly dues members 
must pay. 
e. A pledge, in a form prescribed by the board, that the organiza­
tion will comply with the laws of the state and that it will accept 
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members without regard to age, race, sex, religion, national origin, 
or physical disability as provided by law. 
f. A financial report and audit. 
3. The constitution or bylaws of every employee organization shall 
provide that : 
a. Accurate accounts of all income and expenses shall be kept, and 
annual financial report and audit shall be prepared, such accounts 
shall be open for inspection by any member of the organization, and 
loans to officers and agents shall be made only on terms and conditions 
available to all members. 
b. Business or financial interests of its officers and agents, their 
spouses, minor children, parents, or otherwise, that conflict with the 
fiduciary obligation of such persons to the organization shall be pro­
hibited. 
c. Every official or employee of an employee organization who han­
dles funds or other property of the organization, or trust in which an 
organization is interested, or a subsidiary organization, shall be 
bonded. The amount, scope, and form of the bond shall be deter­
mined by the board. 
4. The governing rules of every employee organization shall provide 
for periodic elections by secret ballot subject to recognized safeguards 
concerning the equal right of all members to nominate, seek office, and 
vote in such elections, the right of individual members to participate 
in the affairs of the organization, and fair and equitable procedures in 
disciplinary actions. 
5. The board shall prescribe rules and regulations necessary to gov­
ern the establishment and reporting of trusteeships over employee 
organizations. Establishment of such trusteeships shall be permitted 
only if the constitution or bylaws of the organization set forth reason­
able procedures. 
6. An employee organization that has not registered or filed an 
"nniïsi report, or th?. t  h?.? fp.iieô corp.p'y with ntVipr nrovisinns of t 'nis  
Act, shall not be certified. Certified employee organizations failing to 
comply with this Act may have such certification revoked by the board. 
Prohibitions may be enforced by injunction upon the petition of the 
board to the district court of the county in which the violation occurs. 
Complaints of violation of this section shall be filed with the board. 
7. Upon the written request of any member of a certified employee 
organization, the auditor of state may audit the financial records of 
the certified employee organization. 
SEC. 26. NEW SECTION. Employee organizations — political con­
tributions; An employee nrgani/ntinn shall not make any direct nr 
indirect contribution out of the funds of the employee organization to 
any political party or organization or in support of any candidate for 
elective public office. 
Any employee organization which violates the provisions of this 
section or fails to file any required report or affidavit or files a false 
report or affidavit shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not 
more than two thousand dollars. 
Any person who willfully violates this section, or who makes a false 
statement knowing it to be false, or who knowingly fails to disclose a 
material fact shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine or not more 
than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than thirty days 
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or shall be subject to both such fine and imprisonment. Each indi­
vidual required to sign affidavits or reports under this section shall be 
personally responsible for filing such report or affidavit and for any 
statement contained therein he knows to be false. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit voluntary con­
tributions by individuals to political parties or candidates. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to Umit or deny any civil 
remedy which may exist as a result of action which may violate this 
section. 
SEC. 27. NEW SECTION. Conflict with federal aid. If any provi­
sion of this Act jeopardizes the receipt by the state or any of its politi­
cal subdivisions of any federal grant-in-aid funds or other federal allot­
ment of money, the provisions of this Act shall, insofar as the fund is 
jeopardized, be deemed to be inoperative. 
Editor's Note: This copy of Chapter 20, 1975 Iowa Code, was re­
printed from the Acts of the 1974 Kegular Session, 65th General 
Assembly. These sections appear in the Iowa Code with the designa­
tions "20.1, 20.2, etc." 
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